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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Roger L. Cross for the Master
of Arts in History presented July 12, 1994.

Title:

Freedom as Self-Legislation:

An Examination of

Rousseau and Kant.

Rousseau and Kant were philosophers of freedom.

Both

believed freedom was the essence of humanity, and both
believed that "freedom is self-legislation."

This thesis

examines what they understood to be self-legislation.
According to Rousseau natural freedom was lost with
the establishment of society.

Society is an "unnatural"

order and the true basis of society is simply convention.
Man is free only if he is subject to laws of his own
making, or at least to those laws to which he has
consented.

The ideal state, according to Rousseau, is the

republic based on laws that have been created and adopted
by each members of the community.
freedom,

It is in this sense of

for Rousseau, is self-legislation.

Kant believed the important issue was demonstrating
the metaphysical possibility of freedom, not the

2

reconstruction of society.

Kant argued that freedom could

be demonstrated, and morality reaffirmed, by focusing on
the

11

ought" of reason.

The

11

ought

11

world and was a pure law of reason.
the physical laws of causality.
according to this law of reason.

transcends the physical
It is not subject to

Man has the ability to act
Man is transcending the

physical realm, and the physical laws of nature, whenever
he makes a moral decision based on what he

11

ought

11

to do,

or whenever he puts duty before his physical desire.

This,

Kant argues, is self-legislation, and only here may man
hope to be free.
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CHAPTER 1
ROUSSEAU ON NATURAL MAN
INTRODUCTION

I began this thesis under the influence of Ernst Cassirer. Cassirer, in his
works on Rousseau and Kant, convinced me that there was a strong and
direct line of debt owed by Kant to the works of Rousseau. Cassirer's
interpretation was strengthen by quotes from Kant's letters, and comments
Kant wrote into the margins of various books he had read. Together they
supported Cassirer's argument that Rousseau taught Kant to see moral
philosophy and freedom in a new light. Kant himself declared that just as
Newton had uncovered the laws of physical nature so Rousseau had
uncovered the laws of the human heart. Cassirer was able, with this
evidence, to make strong his argument that Kant's notion of freedom is
directly indebted to the doctrine found in Rousseau. This thesis is an
examination of Rousseau's influence on Kant's notion of freedom in light of
the interpretation offered first by Cassirer.
But, research could be described as a form of dialogue, and dialogue
frequently takes on a life of its own. As I reached the final section of my work
and looked back over what I had set out to show and what I had in fact
actually shown, I found it increasingly difficult to maintain my original
premise in its full force. Certainly there are signs of a Rousseauian debt in the

2

work of Kant, and I believe I have uncovered some of them in the course of
my work, but at the same time I must admit I have backed away from the
strength of my original convictions. The "debt" seems, now, far smaller than
it had at first.
There is, however, a noticeable similarity in form to the solution of the
question "what is freedom?" in the work of the two men. It is a solution
which may be briefly stated as "freedom is self-legislation." Freedom is the
capacity to dictate to oneself standards of behavior. I cannot be forced to obey
a law someone, or something, has decreed is the law. I may be forced to act
contrary to my will, but that just means I am not free.I
If I am free then I am a "law unto myself." But neither man believed

this self-legislation would justify an attitude of "they did what was right in
their own eyes." Quite to the contrary, both Rousseau and Kant leave little
room for individual incentive for all the talk of "self-legislation." Morality
does not vary from individual to individual in the works of either. One
important factor in this invariance is that both Rousseau and Kant believe
morality, and moral choices, are founded upon laws of reason. "Laws of
reason" are usually considered somewhat static, and if this had been the case
in Rousseau, then the similarities between the two men would have made
Cassirer's interpretation almost iron-clad. But it is not the case, and when
one begins to examine what Rousseau actually meant by "laws of reason" -and this in turn will lead to an examination of the "nature" of reason, and
the "nature" of morality--then the rope which a moment ago bound the two
thinkers so tightly together now appears extremely frayed and tenuous.

1With one notable exception--see below, ch. 2, sec. 6.
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Yet, it is my contention that once the differences are noted and
acknowledged to be irrefutable we still can find in Kant a bedrock which
distinctly bears the marks of Rousseau. This is far from saying that Kant
borrowed from Rousseau his notion of freedom, but I do believe that it is as
important to note the influence of Rousseau on Kant as it is to note the
Wolffian, Humean, and Newtonian.

In fact, I believe that Rousseau served

Kant in much the same way that Hume served him. In many ways Rousseau
was Kant's foil, and much of Kant's work is directed against positions he
believed held by Rousseau. But in equally important ways Rousseau also
forced Kant to view the problems and nature of philosophic issues from a
new perspective. I do not believe it would have been possible for Kant to
have written the Critiques in the manner he did without this perspective. To
make the case stronger (though more debatable) I believe that the central
emphasis of the Critiques on moral and individual freedom reflects both
Kant's debate against, and his agreement with, Rousseau. I will seek to show
that Kant took from Rousseau a political notion (that freedom is selflegislation) and turned it into a metaphysical principle.
THE TWO NOTIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE WORK OF ROUSSEAU
Rousseau held two concepts of freedom. One existed, he believed, in
the state of nature, while the other, at least potentially, exists in the political
state. Previous readings of Rousseau had elevated the former type of freedom
to such a high state that it was often believed Rousseau was an advocate of
the "noble savage." Rousseau was portrayed as a proponent of returning to
nature, and it was widely believed that he had a disdain for anything which
restricts our natural freedoms. Such a view can be seen, for example, in the

""'
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work of Edward Buchner. In an introduction written in 1904 to a collection of
Kant's lecture notes on education, Buchner notes that, unlike Kant, Rousseau
"praises barbarity,"2 and seeks to return man to his instinctual self. Rousseau
was often cast as favoring "instinct" and "passion" over reason. This
interpretation still may have supporters, but it definitely was undermined by
the work of scholars in the early part of this century. It was only then, Peter
Gay notes, that Rousseau was reevaluated by a small group of scholars,
among whom was Cassirer.3 Perhaps it is too simplistic to see a revival of
Rousseauian scholarship, but certainly much of the general stereotypes about
Rousseau and the natural man fell out of favor in the secondary literature.
Such a quote as Buchner's would be difficult to discover in the Rousseauian
literature of the past fifty years.
The view of Rousseau as a proponent of barbarism no doubt stems
from the reading of his two Discourse. It is unquestionable that Rousseau
presents pre-social man as far more happy, healthy and even "good" than his
descendants. The picture he paints is one of idyllic primitivism versus
decadence. It would be understandable, therefore, to mistake Rousseau's
intentions and believe he sought a return to the goodness man has lost in
society. But this was not the case. As I will show, man cannot go back, and
Rousseau's program, rather than trying to find a way back, will be to try and

2Edward F. Bucher, Introduction to The Educational Theory of
Immanuel Kant translated and edited by Edward F. Buchner. (Philadelphia:
J.B. Lippincott Co., 1904), p. 27
3Peter Gay, Introduction to The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau by
Ernst Cassirer, edited and translated with an introduction and a new
postscript by Peter Gay. 2nd edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989),
p.17
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construct a society in which much of the former happiness of "natural man"
will be restored to social man. But, even after having noted Rousseau's
intention, it is possible to still mistake the means Rousseau believed would
be necessary to construct this happy social order. The mistake would be to
assume that, since Rousseau obviously holds the natural state in such high
regard, he will attempt to import the "natural order" into the social. He will
seek to found his state upon the principles of natural right and law. This
would be a logical conclusion, but it would be in error. Natural law,
Rousseau believed, when understood as a moral order which arises from a
source other than the mind of man, is not a sufficient guide for our actions.
Furthermore, the man who relies upon nature as a standard of behavior is
not only foolishly in error, but, again according to Rousseau, he is not free. I
will eventually show that this rejection of "nature" or "natural law" is central
to the moral philosophy of both Rousseau and Kant. It is one of their true
similarities. It is also this rejection of natural law as a standard for selflegislation which will lead to the conclusion of both men that true morality is
tied up with the laws of reason, and it is the human ability for self-legislation
which demonstrates man's freedom. But, before showing how and why they
reject natural law I must first attempt to clarify what they were objecting to by
clarifying somewhat the notion of "natural law" in the eighteenth century.
NATURAL LAW
The Traditional Views
Natural law, by the time of Rousseau, was already an overworked
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term. The concept had "seldom been precisely defined,"4 and by the end of
the eighteenth century this imprecision lent itself to an unfortunate
ambiguity. We find, in the works of this period, that "almost any outlook"
could be encompassed in the terminology of "natural law".5 Rousseau is no
better in this matter than is his contemporaries, and in fact may be worse than
most. He has been aptly described as "a Janus-like figure in the history of the
School of Natural Law."6 He typically will use it when it serves his purpose
to do so, and then renounce it as no standard at all when it no longer seems
useful? I shall concentrate on his rejection of natural law, for I believe his
moral theory, and theory of the state, is not built upon the notion of natural
law, but is in fact a clear and significant rejection of natural law theory.
The first formation of the "naturalness of justice" comes from the
Greek stoics. 8 According to Zeno and others the universe is governed by laws
of reason. "Inanimate things and brutes invariably obey these laws, the first
out of necessity the second out of instinct."9 Man however is free to obey or
disobey this law, since he is not subject to instinct. He has the power of free

4ttenry Vyverberg, Human Nature. Cultural Diversity, and the French
Enlightenment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 25
5J[erome] B. Schneewind, "Kant and Natural Law Ethics." Ethics Vol.
CIV (Oct., 1993) p. 57
6Ernst Barker, Introduction to Natural Law and the Theory of Society:
1500-1800 by Otto Gierke (Boston: Boston Univ. 1957) p. xliv
7Barker, Introduction to Natural Law and Theory. p. xliv
8Richard Wollheim, "Natural Law," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Vol. V (New York: Macmillian Publishing Co. 1967) p. 451
9wollheim, "Natural Law" p. 451
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choice. Rousseau's view of natural law bears a resemblance to this stoic
notion.

But, the stoics also believed that by looking at the nature of the
universe, and by examining the rationality of his own mind, man should be
able to construct a just and moral state. In this sense, the law of "natural"
reason could be described as a transcendent, static law which serves as the
ultimate reference for all "human" laws. In some ways this view of the law
of reason is similar to the conclusion Kant adopted, but it is here, as I will
show, that there was the greatest disjunction between Rousseau and the
stoics--and by extension, Kant.
Natural law grew in significance during the late middle ages, but the
golden age of natural law was certainly the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.10 By this time there had been a move away from the "divine"
elements of natural law which it had acquired during the middle ages. In the
work of Voltaire, for example, there were two elements to natural law: "its
fixed, eternal nature and its moral utility."11 When Voltaire spoke of natural
law he was usually referring to it in a "ethical and normative ... " manner.12
The law of "transcendent" reason and the law of nature are then in many
ways synonymous. The great order of the watch-like universe is linked to,
and discoverable by, the mind of man, according to Diderot, because "natural

10Barker Introduction to Natural Law and Theory p. xli
llvyverberg Human Nature p. 25
12vyverberg Human Nature p. 25
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law is ...based on 'natural reason' and includes 'certain rules of justice and
equity which natural reason alone has established among all men .... "13
Rousseau's View:
The major objection Rousseau had with both the stoic and the more
contemporary view of natural law was that they were based on the primacy
(perhaps 'transcendence' is the better term) of reason. For Rousseau natural
law "cannot be based, even theoretically, on reason."14 Rousseau rejected all
previous forms of natural law due to their reliance on some pre-existent and
transcendent reason supposedly which is found in nature and in men. His
own reformation of the relationship between natural law and reason was the
subject of his Second Discourse.
In this Discourse Rousseau sought to answer the question: "What is
the origin of inequality among men, and is it authorized by the Natural
Law?" Rousseau claimed that the question itself was faulty since it made
natural law a consideration in the discussion of social inequality. Rousseau
did not believe the two were related. For Rousseau the discussion of natural
law was only interesting in delimiting natural man's difference from the rest
of creation--thus it is significant only in a negative sense. It was useful, at
least in the Second Discourse only in the discussion of the ways man differs
in essence from animals.

13vyverberg Human Nature pp. 25-26
14Roger D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1968) p. 81
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NATURAL FREEDOM
In the Second Discourse Rousseau stated that man is not like other

animals because he is not forced to act by instinct in any particular way.15 As
an example of this he described the cat sitting, and starving, upon a pile of
fruit. The cat could very well feed itself if it were inclined to do so, but the cat
is instinctually "hard wired" to such a degree that it is unable to exert enough
freedom and independence even to save its life.16 Implicit in this is that men
have the capacity to go against what may be called an 'instinctual hesitancy'.
A man, faced with a choice between starvation and, say, cannibalism is not
predictable like the cat. Supposing that the repulsion to cannibalism was
instinctual and not simply social (Rousseau's view seem to suggest it is the
latter17), we would still run the risk of loosing money on any bet against a
man resorting to such measures. Though he may have instinctual drives,
and about this Rousseau is fairly unclear, man, unlike animals, is not limited
to those instinctual drives.18 "Nature commands every animal, and beasts
obey. Man feels the same impetus, but he knows he is free to go along or to
. t .... 1119
res1s

15Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality in The
Basic Political Writings introduction by Peter Gay. (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Co., 1987) p. 44
16Rousseau, Inequality p. 44
17Arthur M.Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of
Rousseau's Thought (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990) p. 144
18Rousseau, Inequality p. 44
19Rousseau, Inequality p. 45
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Since an animal "chooses or rejects by instinct"20 it is under natural
law in the sense of natural law which makes it more similar to the physical
laws of nature than to a moral law. But man, according to Rousseau, can "by
an act of freedom" obey or disobey this physical, natural, law.21 Man is,
therefore, not under natural laws unless he allows his instinctual drives to
determine his behavior. But in a significant way even the ability to obey
natural, instinctual, drives is to exercise freedom. Even in a natural state,
therefore, man is free in the sense that he is not "hardwired" or not simply
reducible to natural laws of physics like a falling stone.
What, then, gives rise to this special ability to act freely in the human
animal which is not present in "machine-like" animals? This question leads
to a discussion of freedom itself. To understand this lawless form of freedom,
as opposed to social, lawful freedom, it is necessary to examine more closely
the essence of man, since it is clear that Rousseau was making this primitive
freedom dependent on some unique quality within man himself.
SELF PERFECTION AND NATURAL LAW
If man is not instinctual like the rest of creation how can he survive?

Rousseau replaces instinct in man with the rather mysterious capability for
"self-perfection. "22 It is this faculty which "successively develops all the

20Rousseau, Inequality p. 45
21 Rousseau, Inequality p. 44
22Rousseau, Inequality p. 45
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others. 23 It gives man the capability to assume at will actions which are
11

instincts in other animals. Thus, he is compensated for his lack of an instinct

by his ability to learn and modify his actions. He can "observe and imitate"
and by doing so may approximate to himself the skills which are pure instinct
in other animals.24 He can alter his behavior.
This ability to imitate and alter his behavior must be distinguished
somewhat from the "understanding" for Rousseau accepted an empirical
definition of the 'understanding.' Thus, he simply made it the reservoir of
all our ideas and, according to him, ideas are all derived from our
sensations.25 Thus, as all beasts have sensations, it is a faculty we share with
all other sensing creatures.26 In this sense at least, man "differs from an
animal only in degree."27 Yet, he can learn from his mistakes and by
watching the efforts of other animals.28 Rousseau, then, gave far more
weight to self-perfection than to the understanding.
Though self-perfection is not derived from the understanding (or
"reason" which has not yet developed at this stage) it is somehow wedded to
this primitive ability, and is the means for man as a species to survive.
Naturally, a capacity for self-perfection would be of little use in a beast which

23Rousseau, Inequality p. 45
24Rousseau, Ineguality p. 40
25Rousseau, Ineguality p. 45
26Rousseau, Ineguality p. 45
27Rousseau, Ineguality p. 45
28Rousseau, Ineguality p. 45
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could not form or understand ideas which arise through the senses. But even
more than a means of simple survival this self-perfecting capability also

provides the basis for the later development of man's reasoning abilities.29
The capacity for "self-perfection" is very unclear and seems in
contradiction with other notions Rousseau had about natural man. As John
Charvet notes it is hard to see how this "self-perfection" would work if man
did not first have the ability to compare his actions with that of some other
creature--but it is exactly this ability to "compare" that Rousseau denies to
natural man.30 Comparison is in fact not only a product of society, but is the
root of most of society's ills.
Another observation about Rousseau's essence of man must be made.
One which is a key element not only in understanding man in nature, but
also of understanding the very essence of society and morality as simply
constructs. Man is by nature, according to Rousseau, a solitary, not a herd,
animal. In many ways this seems to be the weakest beam of Rousseau's
philosophical structure, though it is a beam which bares an enormous
amount of the building's weight. Rousseau seemed to have done little more
than assume the isolation of man in his primitive state. He did tie this
argument to the lack of language skills in primitive man, and sought to
prove by this that it is absurd to suppose that man would, or could, group

29John W. Chapman, Rousseau--Totalitarian or Liberal (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1956) p. 6
30John Charvet, The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau
(New York: Cambridge University Press. 1974) p. 30
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together unless they were under some necessity (like over-crowding).31 Yet,
nothing removes the possibility that men simply preferred the company of

their own kind, much as herd animals are drawn together. Cats may hunt
alone, and dogs in packs, but nothing needs to be assumed about the language
skills of the one over against the other. This objection to Rousseau's "solitary
creature" would not be so serious if it were not so central to his
understanding of primitive, and even social man.
This objection aside, it is clear that a creature who lives in isolation
would have absolutely no use or need for laws of justice in the second,
ethical, sense of natural law. The reason for this is obvious. Without dealing
with his fellow beings the situation of just or fair actions can never, or at
most rarely, arise. Add to this the complete lack of personal property in the
state of nature, no communication abilities but "grunts and moans" and a
poverty of intelligence all around, and it quickly becomes clear that matters of
justice, rights and laws simply would not arise. Justice and rights, according
to Rousseau, can only have meaning in a social situation. Since this was not
the condition of natural man, we can safely assume he was blissfully ignorant
of all such moral notions. Rather, "born for himself alone, he has natural
duties only to himself."32 Thus, not only is man not instinctual, in a physical
sense, but he is also quite ignorant of the ethical norms Rousseau's
contemporaries so often attributed to natural man.
Equally significant is that as a solitary individual man would be
completely innocent of the notion of authority and obedience. This is a very

31 Rousseau, Inequality p. 47-50
32Melzer Natural Goodness p. 128
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important point because with it Rousseau is able to demolish any suggestion
that the roles of lord and vassal, ruler and ruled, is somehow based on the
state of nature, and hence is rational and just. This argument Rousseau
carried over into his own theoretical constructions of a just society, and he
used it to demonstrate that "since no man has a natural authority over his
fellow man ... conventions therefore remain the basis of all legitimate
authority among men."33 The arguments for the "naturalness" of slavery,
nobility, kingships and so on simply are false if man was solitary while in the
state of nature.

MAN'S NATURAL INSTINCTS AND THE NATURE OF LAW
Rousseau had sought to undermine the contemporary notions of
natural law. He rejected the notion that man is physically instinctual, and
with his ideas about solitary man, he tried to undermine the notion of
natural law as basis for ethics and social order. Furthermore, if the ethical
"natural law" is the same as the "law of reason," as so many of his fellow
writers suggested, then Rousseau, by denying reason's existence before the
creation of society equally undermines the whole basis of any "natural law" at
all. What we would find instead is, and this is Rousseau's ultimate
argument, "social laws." Law would therefore be reduced to convention and
not to some abstract realm of static reason. This will be Rousseau's
conclusion.

33Jean-J acques Rousseau On the Social Contract in Basic Political
Writings introduction by Peter Gay (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1987) p. 144

15
But, are there "instinctual" moral factors in pre-social man? There are,
according to Rousseau. Rousseau believed that there are "two principles that
are prior to reason,"34 and hence society. These two drives may loosely be
considered "moral" for they served as the basis for Rousseau's statement that
natural man was "good," but this use of the term 'moral' is rather
unfortunate in just the same sense as is the use of "good" for pre-social
man.35

There are two instinctual drives, first, an interest "in our well-being

and our self-preservation" and secondly, "a natural repugnance to seeing any
sentient being ... perish or suffer."36 It is from these two principles, and not the
quality of man as a social being, "that all the rules of natural right appear .... to
flow; rules which reason is later forced to reestablish on other
foundations .... "37
Preceding reason is self-love and pity. It will be on the basis of these
two principles that society should be built if it were to reflect the natural
order, but Rousseau claimed this has not happened. These two drives are
buried by man's social order and replaced by love-of-self and pride. These
natural drives are weak drives when compared to the social drives man's
reason has taught him. They have a tenuous position as "laws," natural or

34Rousseau, Inequality p. 35
35we must resort to the use of these terms simply because of the
poverty of language to describe the state of man before he invented language,
which was after he had already entered into society.
36Rousseau, Inequality p. 35
37Rousseau, Inequality p. 35
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otherwise, because they can be disobeyed. Perhaps 'inclinations' would be a
better term.

It would be useful, at this point to summarize what can be said about

natural man since he is to be soon left behind. First, he is capable of selfimprovement. This allied with primitive understanding is sufficient to
ensure his survival. Second, he is free. He is not subject to natural instincts,
and thus he is not forced to act in any particular way to the exclusion of
others. Third, he is a solitary creature who has no notion of justice or morals
simply because the occasions when such notions would be useful are so rare.
The conclusions which must be drawn from this is that man is not under any
natural law, moral or otherwise, and therefore natural law cannot serve as
the foundation of political, civil, society since natural law does not play a role
in the essence of man himself.
THE REJECTION OF NATURAL LAW AS THE BASIS OF SOCIETY

Rousseau did not out-rightly deny there exists some moral, rational,
natural law, and in fact he did seem to believe that with enough time the
wise are able to uncover some kind of natural laws. What this natural law
would be is not exactly clear, for in a sense Rousseau has already undermined
the notion of natural law sufficiently to make it irrelevant for his political
philosophy.

But, "instead of flatly rejecting natural law, Rousseau keeps it in

reserve, so to speak. ... natural law is the guide of a few wise men at the
margins of society, but it is useless for the many."38 Rousseau may well have

38Masters Political Philosophy p. 86
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recognized a transcendent form of morality which he argued "comes from
God ...but [he continued] if we knew how to receive it from so high, we would
not need either government or laws."39 In other words, transcendent,
natural law may exist, but it is of little significance for man. Actually,
Rousseau seems unwilling, at this point, to accept the conclusions of his own
system. He accepted some form of "moral" natural law while at the same
time saying it was completely irrelevant.
This led Rousseau to adopting what may seem a curious argument.
Rousseau believed that moral laws must be known to be obeyed, and to be a
universal law of reason it must speak to all men (at least if it is to be a law of
behavior). For example, Rousseau wrote that animals, unlike man, are
"lacking intelligence" not just "liberty," with the result they "they cannot
recognize law."40 The implication is, on the one hand, that law can only be
meaningful where intelligence and liberty are present (that is, it must be
willfully, as opposed to slavishly, obeyed. The subject must recognizes its
existence and, thus, recognizes its significance). Rousseau affirmed this
interpretation by writing that in order for natural law to be a law "not only
must the will of him who is obliged by it be capable of knowing submission to
it, but also, for it to be natural, it must speak directly by the voice of nature. "41
Yet, on the other hand, he seemed to be contradicting himself by
arguing that where these two qualities are present, natural law carries no
weight and does not serve as a standard for action. That is, natural law is

39Rousseau, Social Contract p. 160
40Rousseau, Inequality p. 36
41Rousseau, Ineguality p. 35
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quite useless as a basis for society--but it is only in a society that it can be
known, hence possibly obeyed. But it is clear by examining these passages in
context that Rousseau is asserting that to be a moral law, and not simply a
physical law like gravity which is obeyed whether it is known or not, the law
must be knowable. There is, therefore, a separation between physical and
normative laws. But what does this do to his earlier suggestion that animals
obey instinct, hence natural law? We can only assume that he was equating
instinct with mechanical, physical, laws like gravity etc. This view is also
supported by his statement that animals are merely "ingenious machines. "42
Rousseau apparently held that even if a law of behavior was implanted
into the human heart by God or nature and was mindlessly obeyed, the fact
that it was "unrecognized" by the subject means that it would not award
moral credit to the obedient subject. It would be similar to obeying the law of
gravity. In other words, Rousseau assumed that a subject must have the
ability to consciously obey or disobey for a decision to be classified as moral.
This assumption is wholly unremarkable, for we find a similar view in most
moral theories. It is rational man who has the power to recognize such laws,
not beasts, so the issue of morality can only occur in the behavior of the
rational agent. Unfortunately, the capacity for rational actions already
assumes the formation of society according to Rousseau. This has
consequences for natural law which will soon be discussed. In the meantime
we can restate that Rousseau believed natural law served as no standard of
behavior for man, even though rational man can recognize natural law. The
"goals" of natural law, then, if they are to have any positive significance at all,

42Rousseau, Ineguality p. 44
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must be "reestablished on other foundations," such as politics, morals, etc.
because man has succeeded in "smothering nature," or more exactly, the
voice of nature.43 The "knowability" of law goes a long way in unraveling
Rousseau's view of society, politics and morality. The pertinence of this

position is heightened by examining Rousseau's criticism of his
contemporaries, to which I shall now turn.
In criticizing previous theories which tried to explain the origins of
society, Rousseau complained that they require that men are enlightened and
rational before they established their commonwealth.44 In Rousseau's view
this was nothing short of impossible. He went on to note that: "writers begin
by seeking the rules on which, for the common utility, it would be
appropriate for men to agree among themselves: and then they give the
name natural law to the collection of these rules, with no other proof than
the good which presumably would result from their universal observance."45
According to these writers, claimed Rousseau, man must have had insight
into the nature of organized society before the experience of such a society.
They must have known what would lead to the common good before they
were aware of the good and bad society produces. In short, they would "make
a man a philosopher before making him a man. "46

43Rousseau, Inequality p. 35
44Rousseau, Inequality p. 35
45Rousseau, Inequality p. 35
46Rousseau, Inequality p. 35
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FREEDOM AS THE ESSENCE OF MAN
Rousseau had in mind thinkers like Diderot who had believed that the
"defining characteristic" of man was his reason.47 Rousseau did not see
reason as an essential element in man, and thought the species got along very
well for a long time without it--and were probably happier for it too. Clearly,
"freedom," not reason, was for Rousseau the essential, defining characteristic
of man.
The significance and effect of this natural "freedom" should now be
examined in full. As noted, freedom detaches the actions of primitive man,
who is more than an animal machine, from natural law. One ramification of
this is that social man cannot appeal to natural law as the basis of action, for
natural law does not stand above man in some natural transcendence, nor
can it be appealed to as the foundation of a moral theory. Man's free-will
thus transcends nature, and civic man, as a moral agent, likewise transcends
all static moral systems (though not political systems). To foreshadow a later
school of thought, man, as a species at least, is existentially free.
Thus this original freedom, and the subsequent political freedom,
cannot be based on natural law since this natural law would precede the
faculty of reason which, according to Rousseau, must be already developed if
man is to be subject to natural laws. Man is free in essences because he is not
subject to physical instincts and because it is nonsensical to talk of his
obligation to obey moral natural laws before he has developed the capacity to
reason right from wrong. In addition, morality itself cannot be based on
natural law, for morality can only arise in a social environment and cannot

47Masters, Political Philosophy p. 265
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precede the formation of society. Rousseau would not allow the existence
even of a natural conscience, for conscience is based on an awareness of
morality, and that, as noted, can only arise after the establishment of some
form of society. "A natural law based on the conscience is impossible for man
in the state of nature because it presupposes the knowledge of good and evil,
which can only be known [by social man]."48 Society had already been long
established, according to Rousseau, before humans were sufficiently rational
to reflect on what is natural law or the best order for a state--and by this time
it is too late for them to use it to establish the state.
Rousseau's position may be outlined as follows: natural man is not
subject to instinct or a transcendent moral order, hence he is by essence free.
Later in his development humans begins to group together into social bands,
and from this the social order is born. From society evolves language and
reason at a fairly late date in the whole history of the species. With the rise of
reason man can reflect on his surroundings and "uncover" natural laws. But
by this late stage "natural laws" have little or no real significance, for man is
no longer "natural" man, but has become socialized.
Rousseau seems to be countering a view which may also be outlined as
follows: man is social by nature and this "natural" sociability reflects a natural
order. Modern man, by reflection, can abstract from this natural order and lay
bare the correct and proper order of society since it is the same order which is
found at the heart of primitive society (such as the father-child relationship).
The universe, after all, is exquisitely ordered, and even the most primitive
social order reflects the "watchmakers universe." All that needs to be done is

48Masters, Political Philosophy p. 81
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to observe the basic relationships displayed by primitive society and from
them, by modernizing and refining, arrive at the pure foundation of human
society in its ideal form. This view, as Rousseau has pointed out, assumes
that natural man was rational, indeed a philosopher, from the very start of
his existence. By making society such a late development in the history of the
species Rousseau sought to undermine all "natural" orderings of society, and
sought to show that society was the most "unnatural" of developments.

ROUSSEAU ON POLITICAL SOCIETY

Thus, the long-term significance of Rousseau's rejection of a
transcendent natural law is that it immediately deflates all arguments which
justify social and political inequality based upon the "natural order of
things."49 "Man is born free"SO in the sense that he is subject to no instinctual
drives, no natural laws--he is born into the realm of the possible. But,
Rousseau continued, "everywhere he is in chains" as a result of the political
order he himself, since he is by nature free, has forged. Man is not a moral
being before the formation of society, which means that there was in
Rousseau's thinking a unity of the political and moral. For Rousseau
"Morality is not something externally imposed on men but merely rules they
freely invent for themselves through consent."51
Therefore, one result of this "impotence of natural law" and this
natural freedom was that Rousseau was forced to base virtue and justice on

49Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 143
50Rousseau, Social Contract p. 141
51Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 144
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political society. "In so doing, Rousseau never denies that there is another
possible basis of justice; he simply insists that the alternative is impotent."52
Rousseau, then, saw the basis of society as not natural law, but the "nature of
law." He may have retained natural law in the greater scheme of things, but
he explained it as a product of the formation of a political society and not as
preceding this society.53 That is, he sought to establish political law, and not
natural law, as the true basis of society. For Rousseau political law was
dependent on the "collective general will" and not on some transcendent
morality or order. "The single overriding mission of politics, for Rousseau, is
to establish the absolute rule of law, to 'put law above man' ."54 Upon the
heels of politics rides morality, which is itself a product of the political order-that is, of laws. "Morality is ... merely rules that [men] freely invent for
themselves through consent. [Rousseau liberated] ... man from all moral
standards above his own .... "55 It was this discovery, Rousseau claimed, made
as a result of his experience in Venice and his early studies in the history of
morality, which led him to the conclusion that "everything is rooted in
politics and that, whatever might be attempted, no people would ever be
other than the nature of their government made them."56

52Masters, Political Philosophy p. 85
53Masters, Political Philosophy p. 202
54Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 144
55Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 144
56Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Confessions, trans. by J.M. Cohen (New
York: Penguin Books, 1953) p. 377

24

THE ROLE OF REASON IN HUMAN NATURE
It is only now that we can turn to the role of reason in Rousseau's

system. Reason arose from the use of non-instinctual freedom, and while it
is dependent upon the capacity of self-perfection it is equally dependent upon
the passions. It is the passions, Rousseau wrote, that perfect our reason.57
Our desire for pleasure allied with freedom and the capacity of self-perfection
fuel our quest for more gratification, and the means by which we conceive
and carry out our plans give birth to the power of reason. Yet, the
development of reason comes rather late in the development of the species,
and if it is true that the evolution of language matches the evolution of
reason, as Rousseau suggested, then it is clear that reason is a product of
society. Once more society precedes, in at least some sense, a development of
what some had argued was the basis of both society and natural law. Neither
natural law or society could be based upon a skill which only develops in the
confines of society. It would be senseless to speak of a "natural law" if man
must leave the state of nature to discover such a law. It is even more absurd
to suggest that society is founded on what was a product of society.
KANT ON THE ORIGINS OF MAN
It would be useful at this point to compare, at least cursorily,

Rousseau's natural man with Kant's. In his work "Conjectual Beginning of
Human History," Kant also dealt with bestial man, but did so in the
framework of Genesis. He, like Rousseau, laid aside fact, and seemed to be

57Rousseau, Inequality p. 46
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suggesting: "let us assume the framework of Genesis and see if we cannot
offer a rational account of the origins of man."
Unlike Rousseau, Kant was willing to give a place to instinct. Early
man, according to Kant, may have originally survived on the basis of simple
instinct. Yet, these instincts were not highly developed. Kant envisioned
man as deciding what to eat on the basis of smell and taste. Sensory instincts
were, Kant believed, all that need be posited in order to explain the survival
of the species before the birth of reason.SB Man, according to Kant, is not a
free creature any more than Rousseau's animal machines. It may then be
argued that in their evolutionary approach to the origins of man, Rousseau
and Kant have begun at different stages of development. Rousseau began
after the ascent of man to humanness, while Kant goes farther back in the
attempt to explain the original cause of this ascent. I think this view is
significantly supported by an earlier work in which Kant wrote that "... man
was not meant to be guided by instinct or equipped and instructed by innate
knowledge ... ,"59 and also by a passage in his education theory in which he
wrote that man "has no instinct, and must arrange the plan of his own
behavior."60 Furthermore, Kant wrote in the "Conjectural Beginnings," that

581mmanuel Kant "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" in On
History, ed. by Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1963) p.
55
59Immanuel Kant "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan
Point of View" in On History, ed. by Lewis White Beck (New York: BobbsMerrill Co., Inc. 1963) p. 43
60Immanuel Kant The Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant,
translated and edited by Edward F. Buchner. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co.,
1904), p. 102
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nature so sparsely equips man with the "basic animal equipment" that it does
little more than meet the "most pressing needs of the beginnings of
existence."61 Nature's 'intent', if such a word may be used, is to throw man
onto the reliance of his reason and, as we shall see, freedom. There is
therefore no necessary contradiction between Rousseau and Kant on the issue
of instincts.
The true origin of humanness for Kant began with what in theology
may be called the 'original sin'. The tempter in this case, however, is no
serpent, but the first stirrings of reason. Reason suggested to this brute some
activity which goes beyond mere instinctual desire. Perhaps it saw a fruit
which it was unaccustomed to eating. Reason created an "artificial desire"
which is "contrary" to instinct. Man, in the moment of true inception as
man, transcends his natural desires: he does "violence to the voice of
nature .... "62 Thus, the overcoming of the natural order (which in Kant is
termed 'freedom') was for Kant, as for Rousseau, the hallmark and essence of
the truly human. Once man has trampled upon natural inclination he leaves
the natural order and becomes wholly other. Unlike animals he is not
limited to a "single way" of life, but has discovered that there is an "infinity"
of possibilities which now faces him. Man has learned by this one act that he
can extend himself "beyond the limits to which all animals are confined. "63
He is no longer a member of the natural realm, but now a transcendent being.
The frightful consequence is that having forced his way free he can no longer

61 Kant, "Universal History" p. 43
62Kant, "Conjectural Beginning" p. 56
63Kant, "Conjectural Beginning" p. 56
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return to the blissful ignorance of the beast, for man has peered into the abyss
of limitless possibility.64 He has discovered freedom.
Once man has discovered his freedom all natural desires may be
subjected to the eye of reason. Man no longer must act in any particular way.
Rather, impulses can now be pursued or resisted according to the will. It is in
the resistance of natural impulses and the concern for curtailing the natural
impulse in others (which may arise through the senses--hence the fig-leaf)65
which gives birth to the first principles of morality.66
What has been established so far is that both Kant and Rousseau
defined the essence of natural man in the same way--it was freedom from
instinct and the natural order. For Kant reason and freedom were
synonymous. Freedom is the realization of other possible actions which are
not suggested by instinct or natural law. Kant made this distinction between
freedom and instinct, or natural physical desires, most clear in his Critiques of
Pure and Practical Reason. The distinction between the two realms, the
rational versus the physical was the central tenet of the whole critical
structure, and served as the cause for his division of man into phenomenal
and noumenal. He used this division to defend the absolute law of physical,
mechanical, causality in nature--which for animals includes purely
instinctual behavior--while yet maintaining that man is intellectually, and
thus morally, a free agent.

64Kant, "Conjectural Beginning" p. 56
65Kant, "Conjectural Beginning" p. 57
66Kant, "Conjectural Beginning" p. 57
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Rousseau did not make this "metaphysical" distinction and we need
not look for it in his works, but the acceptance of freedom as basic to the
essence of man was central to his work. This must be understood before one
can safely pass on to his criticism of modern society and also how society
should actually be constructed. That is, it was a doctrine central not just to the
Discourses, but also to the Social Contract and the Emile as well.
CONCLUSION
In the rise of the brute creature to the "human" we see that the major

area of difference between Rousseau and Kant was the role they ascribed to
reason. Kant obviously returned to the view of Rousseau's contemporaries
and accepted the centrality of reason in the development of men. However,
we do not see in his work the notion that the natural, instinctual, state is the
state of reason. Rather, reason is born at the moment of man's rejection of
the natural order. Natural law is not viewed by either man as defining the
essence of the human race.

CHAPTER2
ROUSSEAU ON THE FOUNDATION OF SOCIETY
INTRODUCTION
"Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains." Perhaps it would
be better to recast this quote as "Mankind was born in natural freedom., but
now he is in social chains." Admittedly the original is more pithy, but in
some way this better expresses the true intent of Rousseau's view of both
freedom. and society. In this chapter I will explore Rousseau's views of both.
Natural freedom., according to Rousseau, was lost when man entered
society. At that moment he lost the advantages of the primitive golden age
and reaped only the baneful fruit of social inequality. But it need not have
been this way. Society, in and of itself, need not be an evil. We can view the
works after the Second Discourse as an attempt by Rousseau to fix the
boundaries of a society which would have all the advantages modern society
has to offer without its vices. But, it is still not clear what kind of free society
Rousseau envisions, for social man's freedom. is not synonymous with the
natural freedom. of the forest. That freedom. was lost irrevocably when man
began to claim. property. At that time began all the wants and desires which
enslave man and make him. so unhappy. It will be necessary to examine
what Rousseau means by "free" in a social context com.pared to "free" in a
state of nature. The one must never be confused with the other.
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In the previous chapter it was noted that man in the state of nature was
happy and free. Man was not a fallen creature, but naturally "good" (or at
least amoral) and therefore did not need to be saved from his neighbors by the
creation of a paternalistic society. Rather, man wandered about isolated and
unconcerned with his fellow men. Man had no room for unhappiness
simply because such an emotional state involves the ability of comparison.
Such a feat of reasoning cannot arise among isolated creatures with little if
any reasoning capabilities. It is no doubt the development of this faculty--and
the misery and dissatisfaction which stems from it--which led Rousseau to
declare that reflection was depravity.67 Natural man was not burdened by
reason.
Man somehow fell from this happy state into his present state of
inequality and unhappiness. Though things were created good, "man
meddles with them and they become evil."68 While it will not be in our
interest to trace the fall "out of" the natural state, it must be noted that
Rousseau does not believe that we, having lost our 'naturalness,' can ever go
back. He writes: " ...human nature does not go backward, and it is never
possible to return to the times of innocence and equality once they have been
left behind. "69 We can only go forward. Man must learn to build states

67Rousseau, Ineguality p. 42
68Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile (New York: Dutton 1969) p. 5
69Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Rousseau Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues in
The Collected Writings of Rousseau Vol.l, trans. Judith Bush, C. Kelly, and
Roger Masters. (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1990) p. 213
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which, though not modeled on nature, will yet restore some of the lost
equality of our natural state. Man must reshape society and himself.
But, what kind of society shall it be? Natural law as we saw serves as
no standard and must be disregarded when seeking the proper design of a
society. In fact Rousseau suggests that the attempt to use it in civil society
means following a "false guide" and would be positively harmful.70 What
then shall serve as a guideline and foundation for justice and social equality?
This question introduces us to the primary reason Rousseau rejected natural
law as a model for the state. To understand why he felt it essential to deny
the political authority of natural law will bring greater understanding of his
political theory.
The question then is: "once we acknowledge we cannot appeal to
'natural law' as a moral ideal, what is to serve as the basis of politics and
justice?" It is this question Rousseau turns to in the works which follow the
two Discourses. A careful reading reveals, however, that his answer is
already foreshadowed in the Second Discourse. In fact, Rousseau claims that
his position was not something he worked out over time, but was the
conclusion he arrived at while working for the French embassy in Venice. It
was in this period, he writes, that he discovered "everything is rooted in
politics and that, whatever might be attempted, no people would ever be
other than the nature of their government made them."71

70Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy in The Basic
Political Writings trans by D.A. Cress. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Co.,1987) p. 113
71 Rousseau, Confessions p. 377
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This principle is both revolutionary in implication and serves as a key
to the whole of Rousseau's philosophic system. When it is kept in mind,
what often seems contradictory in Rousseau resolves itself. Rousseau really
is, as he himself claimed, the most consistent of philosophers, at least in
regard to this political thesis.
The quickest and surest method of immersing ourselves into this view
is by trying to reconcile two of his works which, when viewed together, have
always daunted his interpreters. If Rousseau is, as he claimed, consistent then
we should be able to resolve what is often viewed as a 'disunity' (or
something worse) into an unity. This 'disunity' arises when the critic tries to
compare The Social Contract and The Government of Poland.
THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND
Difficulties Involved in Interpreting this Work
Willmoore Kendall in his introductory essay "How to read Rousseau's

Government of Poland" describes the difficulty of reconciling the work on
Poland to the bulk of Rousseau's other work. Frequently the critics do no
better than simply to ignore Poland. Thus, Roger Masters in his otherwise
excellent work The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (1968) only mentioned
Poland in passing. The oddness of this neglect becomes apparent when one
considers that here we have one of the very few works Rousseau wrote which
were actually directed to a real situation and a real problem. The author of
the Social Contract is here describing the reformation of a real state. Where
better, it would seem, to examine the validity of our understanding of his
political theory than in a work which he intended to be put into practice? Yet
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Poland is hardly ever discussed. It is also a burr in the skin of the critic who
would read into the theoretical works revolutionary doctrines of democracy
or liberalism. Likewise, we must pity the poor reader who first approaches
Rousseau by way of Poland, for they will no doubt never understand most of
the current scholarship on Rousseau or be able to shake off the impression of
Rousseau's conservatism and respect for the status quo.
We must join Kendall by asking with him how this work should be
read. Kendall describes various ways to read Poland, but ultimately he settles
on the idea that it is a "venture in 'secret writing'."72

Rousseau really does

not intend this work for the actual state of Poland which so shortly will be
divided up among its neighbors. Rather this is a work designed "for the
territorially extensive modern nation-state as such ... " and it is Rousseau's
intent, not to prescribe to Poland, but to make a work which would serve as a
guidebook for "his future adepts .... "73 In other words Rousseau is aware that
Poland is a lost cause and is writing for future generations. Only in the future
will his true greatness be discovered and they will turn to him for
instructions on the creation of modern nation-states.
It seems this explanation of Poland is dubious. It certainly is true that

Rousseau kept one eye focused upon a future that he believed would finally
vindicate him before his enemies, but the notion of a secret doctrine just
seems too unlikely and clandestine. Furthermore, secret doctrines are
extremely malleable to the interpreter's bias, and are hard either to prove or

72wmmoore Kendall "Introduction" to The Government of Poland by
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Trans. and intro by Willmoore Kendall (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) p. xxvii
73Kendall, Introduction to Poland. p. xviii
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disprove. Gnosticism may be clear to the initiated, but its doctrines must
remain a mystery to outsiders. The same is true for the reader of Rousseau if,
in fact. there is some hidden doctrine behind the words of this work.
What then is the alternative? How can we possibly reconcile, as
Kendall notes, statements about legitimate government being dependent
upon the "general will" of every individual and the suggestions in Poland
that the serfs not be freed?74 How do we steer a course between the
revolutionary implications of the Social Contract and the monarchical, rather
conservative details found in Poland?

Did Rousseau change his mind? Was

he attempting to win over the Polish nobility's support for greater reforms by
conceding to them the points he realized could not be changed anyway
(which would make Rousseau rather the pragmatist)?75 Or do we really have
here some "secret doctrine" which for our purposes renders this work rather
spurious? None of these options is attractive. What is left is to shave the
problem with Occum's razor and take at face value Rousseau's claim that he
was always making the same point throughout all his works. Perhaps the
dilemma is not that we do not correctly understand the Poland. Perhaps the
problem is that we do not understand either it or the Social Contract, because
we do not know what Rousseau means when he writes that "everything is
rooted in politics ... " or when he writes that the "social order ... serves as a
foundation for all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from
nature. It is therefore founded upon convention.''76 To understand both the

74Kendall, Introduction to Poland. p. xiv
75Kendall, Introduction to Poland. p. xvi-xvii
76Rousseau, Social Contract p. 141
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Poland and the Social Contract we must first examine the consequences of
these claims. This once more returns us to the examination of the roots of
society.
ROUSSEAU'S VIEW ON THE FOUNDATION OF SOCIETY
The importance of what Rousseau was really saying about nature only
becomes apparent when the discussion moves from the "historical"
perspective of the two Discourses to the prescriptive found in such works as
the Poland. Whether or not natural man was ruled by the laws of nature and
whether he was thus more moral or immoral than modern man is
interesting and significant, but what would prove far more significant, and
perhaps even dangerously revolutionary, would be the denial of any standard
upon which the current political structures of men are built. This would
suggest "anything goes" and seems likely to result in a free-for-all. This is, it
will be shown, an accurate reflection of Rousseau's views of modern society.
A doctrine that there is no external standard upon which a political
philosophy could be based would remove any restraint on the "possible."
The powerful could, with impunity, exploit the ruled as they please without
the fear of violating some moral standards of God or man. But, on the other
hand, all claims of legitimacy would equally be cast aside. In its place we
would find a "top-dog" notion of force. The ruler's place is assured only as
long as strength maintains him, but he can be justly toppled at any moment
with no fear of stepping upon some "divine rights."

In such an amoral
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political system Rousseau claimed that: "as soon as one can disobey with
impunity, one can do so legitimately .... "77
This state of affairs, according to Rousseau, cannot be counted as a
"social order." Rather we simply see the state of nature writ large. First, as he
notes, "force is a physical power" and so it is impossible "to see what morality
can result from its effects."78 Rousseau then goes on to ask "what kind of
right is it that perishes when the force on which it is based ceases?"
Obviously force is not the basis for morality since it insures no rights nor,
significantly, duties. "If one must obey because of force, one need not do so
out of duty ... this word 'right' adds nothing to force."79 "Duty" is central to
Rousseau's notion of morality, and his philosophy must be viewed in this
light.
A system based on force lacks moral justification. Force cannot be the
basis of any political system. Force is "lawlessness," i.e., it is a return to the
state of nature: "no sooner does a man claim, independently of the laws, to
subject another to his private will, than he at once leaves the civil state, and
in relation to the other man, places himself in the pure state of nature .... "80
By extension any ruler not in place by some common consent of the ruled has
placed himself in a state of nature towards them. He is nothing more than a
brigand.

77Rousseau, Social Contract p. 141
78Rousseau, Social Contract p. 143
79Rousseau, Social Contract p. 143
80Rousseau, Political Economy p. 117
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The fact that Rousseau viewed almost all of modern society in this
light cannot be ignored without casting all of his political philosophy into
confusion. Having denied the prescriptive powers of natural law and
excepting the theoretical social contract of republics, all modern states are
founded on no more of a legitimate basis than force. The fact that these
illegitimate states claim for themselves legitimacy, and a legitimacy which is
believed and accepted by their subjects, is, Rousseau believed, the result of the
greatest deception in the history of humanity. This was, in a way, the "fall"
which is every bit as destructive as the fall in the Genesis account. The rich
completely deceived the poor into exchanging their freedom for slavery in
the name of "common defense."81 That, Rousseau tells us, is the true basis of
modern society and that deception is the true "legitimacy" of its rulers.
Society is based on force and inequality.
This "law" of force still functions and causes never-ending strife and
contention. The only real alternative, Rousseau believed, to this social
division and envy is a harmony based on "convention"--i.e., the acceptance
by all of a set of laws and mores.
Rousseau writes: "Since no man has a natural authority over his
fellow man, and since force does not give rise to any right, conventions
therefore remain the basis of all legitimate authority among men."82 He
removes the appeal to nature or force to justify an act morally. Morality is the
result of convention and consent and is therefore inevitably linked to the
political existence of man.

81 Rousseau, Ineguality p. 69
82Rousseau, Social Contract p. 144
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Logically one can argue that the unrestricted use of force for one's own
good, while not morally justified, is not immoral either--a priori. Rather the

inequality of force and the use of one's force for the attaining of one's own
good is simply man in a state of nature. The reliance on individual force is
not the means of establishing a civil state, but outside such a state "morality"
is not at issue. This is central to an understanding of Rousseau's views of
both politics and the nature of man. In society it is not arbitrary power which
stands supreme, it is law. In nature it is simply force.
Obviously then, the reason that "might" does not make right is that
man no longer is in a state of nature. The loss of natural freedom which
enslaved man may also be the best means of providing him a new basis of
freedom. It is, admittedly, an unnatural freedom being both political and
institutional, but it is the institutions and laws of man which keep him from
the horrible consequences of force latent in his own nature.
This can perhaps be best illustrated in the following manner. It would
be possible to herd a large number of solitary, wild, animals suddenly into a
confined area. The results would be catastrophic if the beasts were naturally
territorial, as solitary species tend to be, and thus antagonistic to others of
their own kind. Suddenly they are surrounded and have no means of escape.
It is possible that not even natural "pity" could prevent bloody encounters. It

certainly would not occur to these solitary animals to suddenly set up a social
hierarchy to prevent innumerable battles over mates, available food, or
territory. Yet this is exactly what happened in the history of man.
The social implication of Rousseauian "self-love" really is a form of
"might makes right." This doctrine is harmless as long as each individual
has room to flee from others of its kind, but could be devastating for a species
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if they were deprived of the option of fleeing and were forced to remain in
close proximity to others of their kind.

Natural freedom is lost with the formation of society. Now all man
has left is the freedom provided by the social and political institutions which
entwine him. But for Rousseau the chains which bind man are also the very
ones which can serve, if rationally used, as the means to a wider form of
freedom and survival than he can otherwise experience. There is a flavor
about this of Hobbes. To clarify Rousseau's position of the state it would be
helpful to compare him more directly with Hobbes.
ROUSSEAU'S VIEW OF HOBBES
From the above it should come as no surprise that there are numerous
similarities between the two since Rousseau himself praised Hobbes's
political understanding. According to Rousseau, Hobbes, "of all Christian
authors," is the only one to grasp the true nature of politics and its
dilemmas.83 Rousseau's praise reveals an undercurrent of his own political
philosophy, his praise is for Hobbes' understanding, and attempted
resolution, of the issue of religious versus political authority. It would be
informative to map out that point Rousseau found so praiseworthy in
Hobbes.
According to Rousseau western civilization has suffered from divided
loyalties. Men have not just their lords set over them, but clerics as well. The
result, from the days of Jesus, has been "infernal division that never ceased to
agitate Christian peoples." All this because Jesus attempted to separate "the

83Rousseau, Social Contract p. 222
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theological system from the political system".84 The tension caused by this
division has been a disease at the heart of the Christian west ever since. No

one is sure to whom he owes supreme loyalty, the lord or the cleric.85
Rousseau believed division in a society was one of the worst problems
a society could face. He praised Mohammed for his "sound opinions" in
uniting political and religious authority under one head and notes that as
long as the two were held by one man the government was good.86 It was
only with the conquest by barbarians that the two became separated--leading
to all manner of corruption and ill-governance. But Hobbes understood the
need to unite the "two heads of the eagle," Rousseau claimed, and had tried
to effect a "complete restoration of political unity, without which no state or
government will ever be well constituted. "87
Ultimately Rousseau thought Hobbes failed to provide a viable
solution to the problem of divided authority. He failed because he
underestimated the power and interests of the priests. Christianity, Rousseau
writes, will "always be stronger than that of the state" in Hobbes's political
system88. Rousseau believed that in a real social order there simply cannot be
any division among the people for "whatever breaks up social unity is
worthless. All institutions that place man in contradiction with himself are

84Rousseau, Social Contract p. 221
85Rousseau, Social Contract p. 141
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of no value. "89 Both religion and political authority must be unified under
one head, and that head will be the political.

This gives to Rousseau's work an element of authoritarianism which
ought not be overlooked. Rousseau clearly did not object to Hobbesian
authoritarianism. He did not criticize Hobbes for giving the political realm
too much power--in fact his major concern was that Hobbes made the
political arm too weak. According to Rousseau, Hobbes does not manage to
fully encompass religion in politics and thus leaves too much room for the
clerics exerting their own authority and thus dividing the state. Rousseau
would have Hobbes and all political philosophers realize that religion must
be a department of the state and that they must give up all notions of creating
a "Christian Republic." These terms are mutually exclusive.90
Still, Rousseau did credit Hobbes with seeing the problem of divided
loyalties of religion and politics in western society, and Rousseau admired
him for this insight. But Hobbes, according to Rousseau, failed to grasp the
correct solution to the problem. According to Arthur Melzer, contrary to
general opinion Hobbes did not just believe humans were too self-willed by
nature and always at war with one another. Hobbes also saw that humans are
far too obedient to authorities. They are too easily led.91 The real danger to
society is not that each man wars against his neighbor, but that they quickly
fall into line behind "rabble-rousers" who seek to overturn the established

89Rousseau, Social Contract p. 223
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authority and put themselves at the head of society.92 Hobbes believed it was
his task to design a political philosophy which would simplify and establish
once and for all the lines of authority and thus guarantee undivided
obedience. In an ideal state the usurper would clearly be in the wrong and
would not gamer wide support. Society, with its clear and clean lines of
authority, would have internal peace and unity. This is the problem Hobbes
set out to address and the resemblance to Rousseau is clear. Nor should we
ignore the methods Hobbes used to reach his goal and how similar they are to
Rousseau's methods. It is interesting that before he tried to prescribe the
shape of the correct state, Hobbes first undermined the traditional lines and
avenues of authority. Rousseau does the same as he seeks to deny the
authority of natural law and treats traditional avenues of legitimacy as simple
power relations. After undermining the alternatives Hobbes employed the
notion of a "social contract" and claimed this is the only sure footing upon
which authority may stand. More specifically Hobbes believed that the "state
of nature" where all warred with all "refutes all claims to leadership and
throws each man back on himself."93 Thus, as Rousseau later, Hobbes
asserted that men coming out of a state of nature are all equal in a political
sense. This is so since all are "politically" equal in a state of nature. It may be
true that physical inequalities may allow one individual to defeat another,
but this does not justify "kings" in a modern society. The two are unrelated.
True authority then is based upon a "social contract" among free and

92Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 121
93Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 122
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equal individuals.94 It is irrelevant to Hobbes who is chosen to rule--or even
what family or dynasty is chosen--what is of importance is that once the
choice is made there cannot be any challenge to the ruler. Any challenge of
the king's authority would be rebellion against the whole, since they made
the original contract. There cannot exist multiple authorities, for once one is
selected to rule he bears the right to all the power of the state. There is no
disunity and people will be free to follow their natural inclinations by
following the legitimate ruler. The greatest evil for Hobbes and Rousseau is
not the arbitrary use of power, but social division.
This was an "ideological revolution" according to Melzer. For the first
time in western political theory the idea of authority is detached from any
claims about a natural moral superiority, or divine right. Hobbes had created
a system where "political legitimacy ... stands independent of any moral or
religious claims .... "95 It is precisely on this point and the method used that
Rousseau agrees and imitates Hobbes. As Melzer writes, it should be no
surprise that both "share an identical view of the central political task ... : both
are obsessed with closing off every possible challenge to the law, both seek an
airtight state with an 'infallible' absolute sovereign .... "96 Furthermore, both
see the greatest danger to the state to be contested authority, especially from
those who claim as the foundation of their authority a "higher law."97 Both

94Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 123
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seek to head off all such claims by strengthening the state and "subverting all
traditional sources of authority .... "98 Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau found the best
guarantor of unity in the state to be strict laws and mores. But both make the
people at least the initial "sovereign" who establish either the ruler (Hobbes)
or rules of the state (Rousseau). Rousseau, as we see, bears a significant
resemblance to Hobbes. The resemblance is far greater than that which he
shared with his enlightened contemporaries. What is noticeably and
centrally different about the two men is Rousseau's dependence on the
authority of laws rather than rulers. It is this solution of the problem which
Hobbes failed to grasp.
LAWS AND CUSTOMS AS THE ONLY VALID SOCIETAL BASIS
Rousseau never equivocates about these points: laws and customs are
the true basis of morality, and a rule of law is the only valid basis for a society.
The spring from which all legitimate laws flow is the general will. The laws
in and of themselves are pure convention, and in fact it is this that Rousseau
believes gives them their validity. Any other source would be to impose
upon man from the outside, and this would deny man's freedom and at the
same time call into question man's need to obey. Man has no duty to obey
sheer force, but he cannot fail to have a duty to laws he himself has freely
consented to, and empowered. It is in willingly binding ourselves by law that
we rediscover freedom. This is the central tenet of Rousseau's philosophy. It
was the tenet that was missed by his contemporaries and subsequent
generations who read into his work a return to the barbarous state of nature.

98Melzer, Natural Goodness p. 125
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This definition of freedom as self-legislation may seem rather counterintuitive, and Rousseau obviously recognized this, for he himself rhetorically
asks how everyone can be bound by laws yet free. He answers that under law
men are actually "free because, under what appears to be subjection, no one
loses any of his liberty except what can be harmful to the liberty" of others.
And, "it is to law alone that men owe justice and liberty."99
It is only with a state formed on the rule of law, Rousseau believed,

that we can avoid the division of authority so prevalent in western history
and also avoid the despotism which is a necessary outcome of unjust
governments based on principles other than the general will. He believed
that free men exercising free reason will inevitable arrive at the best method
for obtaining the common good.100 The only way that the common good
cannot be upheld in such a free state is if there begins to develop factions and
parties within the state. This will split, once more, a man's loyalties and
prevent the necessary free use of reason in the interest of party spirits.
"Political obedience can only be legitimate if it can be explained as a construct
of reason, and such mental constructs ... must take as given ... that each
individual has his own will.. .. "101 Each individual must be free to will for
the common good what he thinks best. Rousseau believes that this will
result in the actual best, for each individual will be willing to put aside his

99Rousseau, Political Economy p. 117
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own "best" for the good of all if he is convinced that all will do the same. No
one individual profits inordinately while the rest suffer (despotism).102
Furthermore the man under the rule of law is truly and uniquely free
for "under law, each obeys and no one commands ... all are equal under it."103
All the inequality of other theories and practices are avoided since there is
none who stands above or apart from the law. Despotism is ruled out and
social division is likewise avoided since the general will battles with no other
power for priority. There is no possibility to challenge the general will apart
from pure rebellion. There is no other means of establishing a basis for
power than the free will of all.
What could possibly be countered to such a power basis? Certainly not
natural law, as this has little or no relevance to society; in fact it is counter to
the very establishment of a society, as Rousseau has shown. In fact he wrote
that the magistrate who listens to the voice of nature is relying upon a "false
guide" which "divert[s] him from his duties" and ultimately leads to his or
the states downfall.104 The law of God, while not specifically addressed,
serves as no more of a basis for challenging the will of the many. We may
infer this from the role Rousseau gives to religion in the state.
As noted before, religion becomes little more than a department of the
state. It is not outside the realm of the state and thus cannot be outside the
domain of the general will. It cannot serve, in this role, as the basis of a

102Rousseau, Social Contract p. 148
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challenge to the state, rather its sole occupation is service to the state.
Rousseau even goes as far as to suggest that the general will is in fact the
"voice of God."lOS
Thus the rule of law is an outgrowth of the general will and that alone.
It is little more than the voice of the general will. It is for this reason

Rousseau distinguished between a government and the sovereign. It is the
sovereign which is synonymous with the general will, or what Rousseau calls
the "body politic."106 This body politic is, according to Rousseau, "a moral
being which possesses a will; and this general will, which always tends
towards the conservation and well-being of the whole and of each part .. .is the
source of the laws .... "107 It is, by this definition, impossible for any law,
accepted by the body politic, to be anything other than lawful, moral and just
for this would suggest that something "prescribed by law could fail to be
lawful."108 Thus, there is no possibility to label Spartan boys 'thieves' when
they stole for their dinners. This act was dictated by their customs, the general
will, and was therefore fully lawful and moral in that society. Therefore the
"laws" of the general will are all 'just' since for Rousseau by definition there
is no other notion of 'just' than the self-imposed rules (laws and mores) of
the collective. Rousseau has effectively removed all other, external, means of
judging the "just" than this notion of self-imposed convention and in his
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political theory "law is prior to justice."109
There is no division: there is no despotism. Man is free in a sense very
unlike his natural state. In nature man was free because he was bound to no
one and no place. This is mans' "natural liberty" with its "unlimited right to
everything" which tempts a man with whatever he can acquire.110 In society
the converse is true. The only freedom attainable is that in which all are
equally bound to each other and to their state. Rousseau calls this "civil
liberty."111 In a sense, it seems, in Rousseau's state man is free to be equally
enslaved. The advantage of this system over the current state of affairs is that
in modern society some are more enslaved than others. Envy is a natural
result and social division is its product. It is interesting to note, and we shall
return to this subject below, that Rousseau puts less trust in actual written
laws than he does in social mores--what may perhaps be termed 'laws of the
heart'.112 The significance of this notion will become clearer when we turn
from the theoretical to the concrete example of a state.
ROUSSEAU'S WORK ON POLAND RECONSIDERED
We return now to the issue of the Poland. It is time to reconsider this
work, which seems so contrary to his earlier work, in the light of the above.
With his emphasis on law, his dislike of despotism and social division, is it
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possible to believe, as many critics have, that in this text Rousseau should
have suggested the toppling of the existing system and its replacement with a
more egalitarian, liberal, form of government? Is it a surprise we cannot find
such a doctrine in this text? And is it not this misunderstanding of
Rousseau's political system which has led people like Kendall to posit and
seek some "secret doctrine" written between the lines?
Rousseau himself makes it quite clear that he "always insisted on the
preservation of existing institutions holding that their destruction would
only remove the palliatives while leaving the vices .... "113 He was, above all,
the political theorist who "maintains the truest respect for the laws and
national constitutions, and who has the greatest aversion to
revolutions .... "114 We need not view this bit of writing as a clever apology
against his detractors, for once more he stressed the avoidance of social
division and the maintenance of the laws. This is fully consistent with his
ear lier work.
Yet, the troubling question remains--what of the serfs? Are they not
men? Do they not deserve immediate liberty? Should a bad system be kept
simply because a major change would result in anarchy? There must be
change, it is true, but Rousseau makes it clear it cannot be rapid. It would be a
"great and noble enterprise ... " to free the Polish serfs, but Rousseau still warns
the Poles not to be too hasty in this direction. Before they embark on
emancipation the reformers must make the serfs "worthy of liberty and

113Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacgue p. 213
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capable of bearing it."115 This returns us to the significance of what Rousseau
meant by "laws of the heart."
It is not enough, Rousseau states repeatedly, to simply write laws. In

fact he will argue that the need to do so is already a sign of a state's weakness.
The centuries have given us plenty of written laws. It is not to these laws we
should look for the maintenance of the republic, it is rather to the laws of the
heart. These make written laws almost superfluous: "the greatest support for
public authority lies in the hearts of citizens, and ... nothing can take the place
of mores in the maintenance of the government."116 Real authority is that
which "penetrates to the inner part of a man and is exerted no less on his will
than on his actions."117
The reason serfs and slaves must be made "worthy of liberty" is that
they must first have the laws instilled into their inner being. Simply to end
their servitude would not be to make them free. Freedom is, as so often
noted, "obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself.... "118 We must
immediately add that this should not be mistaken for some brand of broad
individualism. Rousseau previously noted that "whoever refuses to obey the
general will will be forced to do so by the entire body. This means merely that
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he will be forced to be free."119 Once more we must call attention to the
previous quote that the laws must "penetrate" in such a way that not only
actions, but even the will is determined by them. There is, about this notion,
the air of "indoctrination."
Throughout the works of Rousseau we find an emphasis on education.
Education is not simply, or even primarily, book-learning. Rather, he saw
true education as learning to love one's country and being a good citizen. It is
an education in "virtue,"120 and a respect for the laws, customs and mores of
the fatherland. It is "education that you must count on to shape the souls of
the citizens in a national pattern and so to direct their opinions, their likes,
and dislikes that they shall be patriotic by inclination, passionately, of
necessity."121
Rousseau denied instinct, rejected natural law and even the law of
God. In its place rests patriotic education, love of the fatherland and love of
its laws. By implication he has declared man as infinitely malleable, and
believes that "in the long run people are what the government makes
them."122 The government molds, it teaches them to conform their wills to
the general will, or mores of the state.123 It teaches them to be virtuous,
which is nothing more than the "conformity of the private to the general
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will.. .. "124 Virtue is synonymous to being a good patriot, i.e., willing the
general will. Freedom is obeying it. Men do so freely, but after a life of
indoctrinating education they could do little else. And if there appears an
individual who manages to overcome his moral education then Rousseau
has prescribed a simple course. He must be forced to be free. He must be
forced to obey.
You may make a former slave or serf obey the written laws of the
republic, but unless they first are trained to love the fatherland you cannot
claim that they are virtuous, citizens, or even free. You have removed
physical shackles, but shackles remain. Simply to remove them from
physical servitude is irresponsible and dangerous for this introduces an
element of anarchy and "naturalism" into civil society. Thus Rousseau is
perfectly consistent on the issue of the serfs. They will need to be trained first
to be citizens before they can be made so.
ROUSSEAU AS THE CONSERVATIVE REFORMER
In brief, the state can serve as both oppressor or benefactor to man. Yet
even when it serves as oppressor it cannot be lightly cast aside for the simple
reason that it in some fashion prevents the blood bath of lawlessness. Even
in bad governments a framework is established and Rousseau is careful about
overturning the existent framework. In the work Rousseau, Judge of JeanJacgues Rousseau writes that contrary to widespread belief he never wanted to
"plunge the universe back into its first barbarism ... " by advocating the

124Rousseau, Political Economy p. 119
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destruction of social institutions.125
Thus in the debate over whether Rousseau was a revolutionary or a
conservative, it would seem that he could best be described as the careful
tinkerer. His real revolutionary doctrines are not about the "form" of
government but of man. In regard to the form of the state, such as Poland,
Rousseau feared that any change in a state's institutions might not bring
about the desired results of greater freedom, but on the contrary might
produce even less freedom and happiness. Rousseau claimed that he had
"the greatest aversion to revolutions ... " though people insisted on seeing him
as a "promoter of upheavals and disturbances .... "126 The Poland can, then, be
read without resorting to Kendall's "secret doctrine" and the apparent
"decoder ring" it would require.
If there is still any doubt about his position we can take as our cue his

attitude about returning men to the state of nature. It is unquestionable that
he argued man was "happier" in this state than he now is. But, does he
suggest that man should work towards returning to this state? Obviously not.
He argues that man would no longer be happy in that state and in fact would
be even more miserable than he is now--assuming he was even able to
survive. The best means of increasing happiness and freedom, according to
Rousseau, is to tinker with the existing state of affairs, not attempting to cast
overboard what exists and restart from scratch. Rousseau is a political
reformer, not a revolutionary.

125Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacque p. 213
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ROUSSEAU AND KANT: THE LAWS OF REASON
The philosophic underpinnings to Rousseau's system are also now

clearly exposed. We can see features of this system which so influenced Kant.
In fact Rousseau foreshadows, as Charles Taylor notes, that feature of Kant
which is most revolutionary in the history of modern moral theory.127 The
feature which Rousseau and Kant share is the notion of morality founded
upon "laws of reason."
In a sense this follows, as noted above, from the idea of morality as
convention rather than being based on some external standards. In Kant's
hands this doctrine will result in a radical notion of "free moral subjectivity"
which does not rest upon an "aesthetic" notion of taste or pleasure
(happiness), but is both categorical and unconditional.128
"What Rousseau has actually done is to redefine freedom in terms of
an "ought," which is obedience ... to the "collective self" rather than the
"human self," to "culture" rather than to nature.129 This "ought," which in
itself is something of a totalitarian notion, manages to give moral laws the

"necessity of physical laws .... "130 It is this "necessity," this "ought," which
will play such a significant role in the understanding and work of Immanuel
Kant.
There is a difference as we shall shortly see, and yet the division

127Charles Taylor Hegel and Modern Society (New York: Cambridge
Univ. Press 1979) p. 4
128Taylor, Hegel p. 4
129crocker, Rousseau p. 13
130crocker, Rousseau p. 21

55
between the two men's notion of 'ought' is not that drastic. When Rousseau
sums up the gains man has made by his entrance into a society he does so
with sentiments which can be pulled, almost intact, out of the work of Kant.
He writes that it is the "civil state of moral liberty, which alone makes man
truly the master of himself. For to be driven by appetite alone is slavery, and
the obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself is liberty. "131 This is,
in a rather uncomplicated fashion, the summation of Kant's ethical and
metaphysical philosophy. As Cassirer writes, "Rousseau's ethics is not an
ethics of feeling but the most categorical form of a pure ethics of
obligation ... that was established before Kant."132 In fact, even if Kant had
never acknowledged his debt to Rousseau this passage alone should have
served as evidence of the debt. In the works of both there is an identification
of the moral realm and the moral laws of behavior with reason over feelings
and "instinct." In Kant's hands this will provide the basis of all human
freedom in the moral realm while acknowledging necessity in the physical.
CONCLUSION
What can we conclude about the nature of Freedom in the works of
Rousseau? Freedom is a consequence of political systems, and in
contemporary states man is not free. Rousseau does not believe there is
metaphysical freedom, but natural--i.e., lawless--freedom and the potential
for political freedom.
Rousseau is not interested exclusively, or perhaps even predominately,
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in political forms, but rather in the structures of society and the molding of
men which give these forms life. That which he calls the "convention" and
the "free willing of the general will" will be translated by Kant into the
"ground" or "foundation of morals." Simply changing the type of
government will not alleviate the problems that were apparent in the prior
form. One must go deeper than that into the mind of man himself.
It is equally significant that by binding politics and morals Rousseau is

also making a significant statement about morals.

The conclusion one could

draw is that there is no discussion of morals outside of a "political" context.
In the end it is for that reason that "no people would ever be other than the
nature of their government made them." The people are here presented as a
product of their society, and not the other way around.
This does seem to be in line with what Rousseau had written even in
his first Discourse where he spent much time showing how society had
become decadent in comparison to the Spartans and Romans. In those days,
he notes, "politicians spoke incessantly about mores and virtue; ours speak
only of commerce and money. "133 This same theme is also to be found in the
Social Contract where we see that to change the individual one must first
change the government--not simply its form, but the rational basis upon
which it rests. This is why Rousseau spends so much time on sovereignty.
He attempted to reinstate the general will as opposed to the false powerstructure which allows the nobles and rich to say "I am the state." He was
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seeking to create a rational basis of sovereignty and authority which was not
subject to inequality, but which would restore all men to an equal footing.

CHAPTER3
KANT ON THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF FREEDOM
INTRODUCTION: A DEBATE ON "INFLUENCE"
It is necessary, before turning to the effects Rousseau had on the

thinking of Kant, to state clearly from the beginning this influence is
contested and highly debatable. Sidney Axinn, writing in the Philosophical
Forum, emphasizes that "no study of the history of ideas should let us
misunderstand the enormous differences between" the two men.1 Axinn
emphasizes how fundamentally the two differ on the discussion of such
things as the origins of man and the conception of the human species and
human history. He seeks to "end the routine repetition of a remark" which
was stated first by Cassirer, "about what Kant is supposed to have learned
from Rousseau." The purpose of his article is to end the unquestioned
assumption that Kant learned a great deal from Rousseau. Rather he claims
that the two men's philosophy is so divergent that we can only mean "learn"
in the sense that Kant studied and analyzed Rousseau. Such a statement is
"harmless but empty."2

lSidney Axinn, "Rousseau Versus Kant on the Concept of Man" in
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The point is well taken, but I believe it overstated. Axinn's argument
should serve as a warning to the interpreter who would finds the philosophy
of Kant as no more than a collection of ideas garnered from his predecessor.
It should also give us pause whenever we assert a debt which is based on

some facile similarity. But Axinn's method is seriously flawed for the same
cause for which he so criticizes Cassirer. He has interpreted Rousseau in a
manner which eliminates the more overt similarities between Kant and
Rousseau, while Cassirer does the reverse. Yet, whenever depicting a debt
owed by one thinker to another it is important to distinguish between what
the one thought the other was saying, and what in fact the other actually did
write. That is, to show that on specific details Rousseau and Kant differed
widely and fundamentally is quite different than denying Rousseau's
influence on Kant. The question really is whether there is evidence that a
significant amount of Kant's philosophy stemmed from his reading,
understanding, and reaction to Rousseau. Furthermore, while Axinn shows
fairly conclusively how far apart the two were on the topics mentioned above
there is still overwhelming evidence that "the 'transcendental turn'," which
forms the most distinctive part of Kantian philosophy, is the result of a "prior
'Rousseauian turn' in Kant's thought .... "136 The importance of this debt
cannot be underestimated. When it is seen that 'reason' is linked to
'freedom' and that 'freedom' is linked to 'moralit)" (and this is the reason
Kant felt it was necessary to write the Critigue of Pure Reason in the first
place) then one can see that Rousseauian elements go to the core of Kant's

136Richard L. Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral
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philosophy. Nor can we ignore Kant's own words about his debt. He recalls
how he was "an investigator by inclination" and at one time believed that it
was this--man living in the abstract world of the mind--which was his highest
condition. At that time he belittle the day-to-day world of commerce and the
society of the lowly on the streets: in his words he "despised the mob, which
knows nothing about" abstract entities and metaphysics. But, as Hume
startles him from his dogmatic, pre-critical, slumbers so Rousseau "set me
straight" and Kant learned to "honor" those non-philosophic masses.137
These are more than the musings of a man seeking to publicly elevate
himself by a display of humanity and humility: his ethical theory was
revolutionary because it established the common moral knowledge of the
masses as the standard of moral philosophy. Kant took ethical standards out
of the hands of the metaphysician and places it solidly among "Everyman."
Newton had uncovered the laws of nature but Rousseau had
"discovered amid the manifold human forms the deeply hidden nature of
man, and the secret law by which Providence is justified .... "138 It is valid to
note how the two differed, but we must also note what Kant believed
Rousseau was saying about the "nature of man." Such an examination will
leave little doubt that Kant at least believed himself indebted to Rousseau.
I cannot leave this subject without noting that I believe the debate
between those who would follow Axinn and those who would follow
Cassirer--the one denigrating the influence and the other perhaps over-

137Kant Educational Theory p. 236
138Immanuel Kant, cited by Ernst Cassirer, Kant's Life and Thought
(New Haven: Yale University Press. 1981) p. 89
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emphasizing it--may in large part be due to differences in the approach to the
history of philosophy. One camp believes that the greatness of thinkers is in
large respect due to their originality and tend to view "influences" largely as
does Axinn: they are "harmless but empty." On the other extreme one will
find those who view all philosophic constructs as little more than a reflection
of their era, social class, nationality etc. For this camp there is no originality,
only "influences" (I shall not place Cassirer in this extreme camp, though I
suspect Axinn tends to view him as at least an accomplice to this extreme). In
my treatment of Kant I will seek to avoid both extremes, and will note both
debt and originality. With this in mind I must immediately state that it is
unquestionable that the similarity between the two is more a matter of form
than content. In the details Axinn is correct, the two men are poles apart.
THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON: THE TWO REALMS
It was mentioned above that there are certain important similarities

between Kant and Rousseau. The

t\~.1 similarity

which may be noted is also

the one most superficial and probably coincidental, but is useful to note for
with it we may come to a clearer notion of Kant's approach to the problem.
Rousseau began his philosophy with ah.critique~' of society and the basis upon
which it was built. He undermined natural law as this basis. Kant was doing
much the same in his Critique of Pure Reason. It is an irony that what is
often taken as his major work was seen by him as merely preparatory to his
real task. In this first Critique he intended to "deny 'knowledge' in order to
make room for 'faith' ."139 He believed he must deprive "speculative reason"

139Immanuel Kant, Critic of Pure Reason translated by Norman Kemp
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of its "pretensions to transcendental insight" in order to renew a meaningful
dialogue on issues such as freedom.140 It is the mistake dogma of
philosophers who have not first examined the foundations of pure reason
which lead to attacks on morality and freedom. Kant believed a careful
examination of the limits of reason will reveal that certain issues such as
those noted cannot be decided either way by reason alone. The Critique was,
then, in some way nothing more than the foundational study of the truly
important issues he treated in his later works. It is, to make an analogy,
Kant's First and Second Discourses. But, for Kant the problem he faced is not
natural law, but like Rousseau he does find it necessary to "clear the field"
before constructing anew.
Naturally,Jf!eedom is of central importance in Kant's philosophj!. Not
only is it, of all our ideas of speculative reason, the only one known a priori
but it serves as the basis for all knowledge of God and immortality.141
Without freedom, Kant argued, morality would not only be impossible but
meaningles~142 But, what is freedom and how do we know about it? Can we

prove it exists? To place these questions into their proper context it will be
necessary to review the condition of metaphysics Kant arrives at in the
Critique of Pure Reason.
Kant divided the world into two: there is the realm of noumena and
Smith. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1929) B:xxx p. 29
140Kant, Pure Reason B:xxx p. 29
141 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason translated with an
introduction by Lewis White Beck. (New York: The Liberal Arts Press. 1956)

p. 4
142Kant, Practical Reason p. 4

63

the realm of phenomena. The noumena world is unknown and
unknowable. What we know we know only through our senses, but we have
no senses which would directly intuit the world of noumena. Instead,
whatever strikes our senses is modified first by the intuitions of time and
space, and then attached to some pre-existent category, or rule of the mind.
This modification is pre-conscious and is not subject to our control. Our
experience is determined by the structure of our own minds and thus limited
by this structure. We are cut-off from the world of "things" and left with a
phenomenal world of "appearances."
The implication of such a theory is far ranging, but even more to the
point is the effect this theory has on self-knowledge. How is the self known?
Is it known by direct intuition? Kant denies this possibility. The self is a
~hing-in-itself and thus a part of the noumena world. Since we have no

means of directly experiencing this world we have no direct experience of
pure self. The self we know is phenomenal and inferred rather than
experienced. The basis of our inference is the unity evident in our
experiences. The multitude (or "manifold") of our experience share a unity; a
unity which does not arise from any particular empirical experience. Rather,
we observe that all our experiences are, in a way, located in a particular place.
There is nothing in the experiences of x at time t, and y at time t4 which
connect them into a unity but that both occur in one "consciousness." Hence
we posit a "subject" of which experience serves as object. The self, then, is
known only by experience and is therefore a member of the phenomenal
world. The self we know is not the "thing" but "appearance" self.
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THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM OF FREEDOM
It is at this point the problem of freedom becomes apparent. Kant

argued, in this first Critique, that all appearance must obey universal and
necessary rules. Appearance must be lawlike. That which is not lawlike is
not knowable. The most famous example of law of appearances, and the one
most germane to this discussion, is the law of causality: i.e., every event has a
cause. The self then, it follows, is also determined by the laws of causality. It
would necessarily follow from this that freedom is an illusion. The self
cannot be free if it is determined by natural causality.
But this runs directly counter to what Kant was taking such pains to
prove. In fact in the preface to the second edition of the Critique Kant
described his efforts as directed towards denying "knowledge, in order to
make room for faith."143 But it now seems that he has destroyed faith in
freedom (and thus God and immortality) by proving the self is determined.
Kant's solution will be found in his division between the phenomena and
noumena self, but his first step will be to examine the very notion of freedom
in pure speculative philosophy.
What can pure speculative philosophy tell us about freedom?
Obviously we have the notion of freedom, and just as obviously it did not
arise from experience. We never observe freedom for what we know from
our senses or as a result of our mental structure is that "every event has a
cause." Yet, there are those who argue that we can know we are free beings
apart from any experience. This, Kant argues, is "metaphysical dogmatism"
and it cannot serve as the basis of our belief in freedom. The reason

143Kant, Pure Reason B:xxx p. 29
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speculative philosophy fails to satisfy our search for freedom is that it
inevitably ends in an "antinomy." Speculative philosophy, at best, can prove
both that we are free and that we are causally determined. Kant seeks to
demonstrate this in the "Third Antinomy."
THE THIRD ANTINOMY
There is an infinite regress in causality. Every effect has a cause, Kant
believed he had already proved this, but this cause is itself the effect of a
previous cause, and that of an earlier cause. Taken to its logical extreme we
find there can never be "a first beginning .... "144 This, however is selfcontradictory for it violates our understanding of the causal chain.1 45 We
must assume, then, a first cause which is not itself an effect. This too is
contradictory, but inescapable. We can only resolve these contradictions by
assuming that something stands outside of "nature" (the sum total of our
phenomenal experiences conditioned by law-like rules of thought) and is,
then, transcendentally free. This thing may so impinge itself on nature that it
may set off a series of events with "absolute spontaneity."146 This is not
simply an argument for a Prime Mover, for Kant distinguishes between the
"absolute first beginning" in time and the initiator of a causal chain.147 The
first is problematic since time is no more than a medium of our intuitions--it
has no existence, or at best an unknown existence, apart from our experiences.

144Kant, Pure Reason A:446 p. 410
145Kant, Pure Reason A:446 p. 410
146Kant, Pure Reason A:446 p. 410
147Kant, Pure Reason B:478 p. 413
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Furthermore, it is not a solution which can give us the desired "free will" for
once a spontaneous action impresses itself upon nature it sets off a causal
chain which carries with it mechanistic determinacy. Thus, the action of a
Prime Mover would still leave us determined.
But, while there is no absolute beginning "in time" Kant did believe he
,,{

had shown the possibility of "relative" beginnings.148 fyhat is, it is possible for
there to be several different "first causes" each setting off a causal chain in the
phenomenal world.' The initiator of these causal chains will be that which
stands outside of nature--the thing in itself. The "thing" can serve as cause
without itself being caused. The "thing" is free, and since the noumena-self is
a "thing," then that self is free while the phenomenal self, which is in nature,
remains determined.
It would be in error to view this argument as Kant's proof of freedom.

Set alongside this thesis is its antithesis in which he argues that "there is no
freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of
nature."149 It is unnecessary to dwell on this antithesis, since the whole of
the Critigue argues for the inescapability of the "laws of nature." What is
important, however, is that according to pure, speculative philosophy both
arguments, taken alone, are valid, and one is as provable as the other. This
means that pure speculative reason is left with a paradox which cannot be
escaped. Reason becomes "divided against itself" by proving two statements

-

which stand in apparent contradiction.150 ,Beason, by speculative philosophy,

148Kant, Pure Reason B:478 p. 413
149Kant, Pure Reason A:445 p. 409
150Kant, Pure Reason B:492 p. 423
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cannot avoid this stalemate, nor can experience settle the issue one way or lhe
other. 1 5 1 What, then, has been proved? Only that the speculative use of

!

reason is unable to decide the issue of freedom, and the proof of freedom
must be sought on other terms.
The positive element, however, which Kant saw in this stalemate was
that "for speculative reason, the concept of freedom was problematic but not
impossible .... "152 Speculative reason may not prove "freedom" but it cannot
prove there is no freedom either. Speculation can make no authoritative
conclusion, and the possibility of freedom is not endangered by any
philosophy which is based on speculative reason. Neither morality nor
freedom are threatened by the laws of science. Speculative reason cannot
threaten anyone's peace of mind with proofs of determinism.

CAUSALITY AND TIME IN THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

Transcendental philosophy has much more to say about freedom than
does speculative philosophy. Kant had already shown that there is a
noumena world and a phenomenal world. He had shown that time was a
medium of the phenomenal world as causality (based as it is on time
sequences) is a category of the mind. Causality involves a necessary series of
events a,b,c, which cannot be reversed or altered. Time, then, is an essential
feature of determinacy. But Kant also holds that "time is only a condition of

151Kant, Pure Reason B:560 p. 464
152Kant, Practical Reason p. 3
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appearances, not of things in themselves."153 If things in themselves are not
in time then the notion of causality holding for them is nonsensical; and if

causality does not hold for noumena things then it is meaningless to view
them as being subject to determinacy.154 They must, therefore, be free.
This position Kant believed would be more obvious if people avoided
the "common but fallacious presupposition of the 'absolute reality' of
appearances .... "155 To view our experiences, the phenomenal world of
appearances, as "real" or at least as the "one" reality leads us to conclude that
as everything in nature follows the laws of causality, then determinacy is
unavoidable. But:
if... appearances are not taken for more than they
actually are; if they are viewed not as things in themselves,

but merely as representation, connected according to
empirical laws, they must themselves have grounds which
are not appearances.156
And, we may add, this "ground" will not follow the laws of empirical
appearance.

CONCLUSION
Kant's claims may be viewed as a negative assertion. This is significant,
for a positive claim would violate his own tenets about the impossibility of
knowing about "things in themselves." His assertion that the "thing" is free

153Kant, Pure Reason B:567 p. 468
154Kant, Pure Reason B:568 p. 468
155Kant, Pure Reason B:564 p. 466
156Kant, Pure Reason B:565 p. 467
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amounts, at this point, to no more than that the laws of appearance do not
hold for non-appearance.

It is also important to recognize, noted Kant, that we cannot

meaningfully consider an action as beginning "in this active being itself; but
we may quite correctly say that the active being of itself begins its effects in the
sensible world."157 To assert that an activity begins "in" a noumena self is to
ascribe a time sequence to the noumena world. This, of course, cannot be
done for in the noumena world "... there can be no change requiring dynamic
determination in time .... "158 We can now say, according to Kant, that
"freedom and nature (the natural, lawlike world of appearance) ... can exist
together without any conflict, in the same actions .... "159 The apparent
contradiction into which speculative reason fell is now shown by
transcendental philosophy to be merely a contrary statement. One and the
same event can be both determined in a natural, empirical sense and be the
result of a freedom.160

157Kant, Pure Reason B:569 p. 469
158Kant, Pure Reason B:569 p. 469
159Kant, Pure Reason B:569 p. 469
160Kant, Pure Reason B:572-73 pp. 470-71

CHAPTER4
PRACTICAL REASON, MORALITY AND THE EVIDENCE FOR FREEDOM
INTRODUCTION: KANT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE "HAPPINESS PRINCIPLE"
Before discussing how Kant believed he could demonstrate the
"probability" of freedom we must first consider his objections to the solution
offered by Rousseau and his other contemporaries. It is in his objections to
"empirical" morality and the "happiness" principle that Kant's system is
shown most clearly. We will introduce his objections by once more
considering the notion of freedom in Rousseau.
Freedom, in the works of Rousseau. is a consequence of political
systems. For Rousseau there is no metaphysical freedom, only natural--i.e.,
lawless--freedom and the potential for political freedom.

Kant could agree

with Rousseau's estimation of contemporary society as corrupt and
repressive, but was troubled by the conclusion that freedom has no separate
metaphysical existence apart from the political order. More was at stake here
than Kant's proclivity towards rationalism. Kant saw Rousseau's conclusions
as a challenge in much the same fashion as had been Hume's attacks on
causality. Kant believed that acceptance of Rousseau's position had the
unfortunate result of removing the foundation of all morality. The loss of
metaphysical freedom was the loss of morals. Kant realized that the base of
the problem lay in his contemporary' s evaluation of reason. Rousseau, and

71

others, had made reason depend upon the passions and on the formation of
society. Kant believed otherwise.

To establish the possibility of freedom, Kant believed he must
demonstrate the fallacy of his contemporaries' notions of reason and the
foundation of their moral theories. He rooted out what he believed to be the
mistaken premises on which both were founded by asking "what is the basis
of morality?" Kant's solution will be that: "the sole principle of morality
consists in independence from all material of the law (i.e., a desired object)
and in the accompanying determination of choice by the mere form of giving
universal law which a maxim must be capable of having."161 These are the
two pillars of Kant's view of morality. On the one hand to be a moral
decision the decision cannot take into account the possible, or even probable
results of that choice. In other words, the decision must have an element of
timelessness. On the other hand the choice must have universal validity, i.e.,
it is not bound to any particular place or situation.

Kant argued that for a decision to be moral we cannot be concerned
with ends. Moral decisions have, then, a timelessness about them. Kant
acknowledged that all rational creatures seek their own happiness.162 It does
not follow, however, that this pursuit is particularly moral or even useful in
morality. To act in a manner with the hope of a particular outcome is
empirical, and hence not a law according to Kant. If we seek happiness by the
pursuit of certain goals we are making "subjective" decisions. That is, we
acknowledge that the means we use today for the attainment of this

161Kant, Practical Reason p. 33
162Kant, Practical Reason p. 24
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happiness are not necessarily the means we will use tomorrow, or have used
in the past. Nor should we expect that the means, or even the goals, we set to

realize our happiness are the same that other people will use or set.
Happiness, is a "particular feeling of pleasure .. .in each man, and even of the
differences in needs occasioned by changing feeling in one and the same
man."163 It is now time to take a closer look at the "happiness" principle.
If the desire for happiness or pleasure is at the root of our actions, could

we say that this form of causality was the result of rational principles?
Perhaps, but certainly there would be important reservations. First, as noted,
any action which has as an end some form of pleasure cannot be described as
universal or necessary.164 Pleasures differ from one individual to another
and even from one moment in an individuals life to another. For example,
suppose an individual is setting up a business. To insure that her customers
will consistently return she may adopt the principle that "honesty is the best
policy." The end which is sought is the establishment of a good name and a
successful business. This may well be rational, and one could say that the
owner is acting under a rational imperative. It is not, however, a categorical
i.e., necessary and universal, imperative. Subjectively it is necessary--that is,
it is necessary at this moment to attain the sought for end, but one cannot

leap from this to categorical necessity. This can be made clearer by continuing
the example. Suppose her father falls seriously ill. The illness is serious and
possibly fatal and the treatment requires strict observance. Thus, the doctors
tell her, much depends on her father's frame of mind--he must not give up

163Kant, Practical Reason pp. 24-25
164Kant, Practical Reason p. 18
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hope and end the treatment. She is now faced with a dilemma. She may
inform her father of the seriousness of the disease under the imperative
"honesty is the best policy" or she may lie and down play the seriousness of
her father's illness, hoping thereby to keep up his spirit. The point is the
imperative now must be re-examined and no longer serves as a necessary
rule, for "this necessity is dependent on only subjective conditions .... "165
Thus, "honesty is the best policy" cannot qualify as a categorical imperative,
but is shown to be simply a "hypothetical imperative." That is, it is
"conditional" for it determines the will "only in respect to a desired effect"
and is therefore a "practical" or, for the purpose of distinguishing it from his
later use of this term, a pragmatic precept and not a universal, necessary
law.166
Kant argued, that all pragmatic precept are "without exception
empirical. "167 Precepts are empirical when an end is desired and the precept
is formulated to attain it.168 Whenever we conceive of some "object" and
seek it, we are pursuing pleasure.169 Both "object" and "pleasure" should be
read here in the broadest sense. The owner's desire for good business may be
viewed as her object, just as the recovery of her father was her object. They
are her immediate goals.

165Kant, Practical Reason p. 19
166Kant, Practical Reason p. 18
167Kant, Practical Reason p. 19
168Kant, Practical Reason p. 19
169Kant, Practical Reason p. 20
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"Pleasure" is also a goal, for it is the "relation of a representation to the
subject by feelings."170 This goal is represented to the individual who
pursues a certain course of actions to attain it. It is desired, not in and of itself,
but because attaining it is believed to bring some form of advantage. But,
desire is from the senses, it is a feeling.171 It is not purely rational for reason
conceives of a goal purely by concepts.172 For Kant, the realm of the rational
is devoid of all subjectivity and feelings.173
Since with empirical precepts we cannot know before attaining the goal
whether it will bring pleasure, pain or indifference we cannot claim a priori
justification for the goal.174 That is, only after the fact can we determine
whether the goal which we thought would bring us pleasure actually does so.
Returning to the businesswoman this may be clarified. Obviously she may
decide that it is better to lie to her father in the hope that his recovery may be
more assured. It is just as possible, however, that her father, not realizing the
seriousness of his condition, neglects certain necessary elements of treatment
that would ensure his recovery. He may fail to take his medicine and, in the
end, do more harm to himself than the awareness of his condition would
have done. After the fact it becomes clear it would have been better to tell the
truth. Yet, the opposite action on her part could lead to similar unpleasant

170Kant, Practical Reason p. 20
171 Kant, Practical Reason p. 20
172Kant, Practical Reason p. 20
173Kant, Practical Reason p. 24
174Kant, Practical Reason p. 20
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results. She informs her father of the seriousness of his condition and the
father in hopelessness, refuses treatment. Obviously, in this case it becomes
clear a lie may well have served better. Yet, the outcome could not be
determined beforehand strictly on a priori grounds. The pragmatic precept
proves itself only after the fact.
Therefore, if happiness is a goal the means to attain this happiness will
undergo numerous variations--and we may find that the happiness of one
man is a direct contradiction to the happiness of another. Happiness between
individuals varies and is not a priori. Since it is not a priori it has no
certainty or universality. Thus, two men doing business may hold different
maxims of behavior in their relations to each other. The one man may hold
that "honesty is the best policy" if he wishes to enjoy the pleasure of repeat
customers and long term profits, while the other man, who has a sick child at
home in need of some expensive medical procedure, may hold as a maxim of
action that everything must be sacrificed to the good of his child, including
his good reputation and the goodwill of his business relations. The first
weighs with fairness the products he sells while the other is doing everything
in his power to stretch his produce with false weights and filler. Which is the
moral man? Kant seems right that if happiness is used as a standard neither
man can be faulted for their actions. On some standards it would be possible
to argue that the man who cheats is actually the more moral of the two for he
seeks happiness not just for himself but for his child--and while the "honest"
man imposes his maxim for the attainment of a more pleasant way of life, the
cheating man does so for the very basics of life. Certainly acts done for the
sake of one's dying child are more noble, and "moral," than those done for
the sake of luxurious living. Equally significant is that we may suppose one
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and the same person to be both the honest and the dishonest in different time
periods. That is, the honest man becomes the cheating man when forced by
the necessity of his child's sudden illness.
Yet, how can one and the same standard produce such contrary
actions? How can a "standard" of behavior produce contradictory actions? A
standard such as this, by the variety of contradictory actions it allows and
even approves, cannot be said to have the quality of "universality."
Furthermore, as noted, another difficulty arises in such a standard. We have
no way of telling or deciding a priori which action will best lead us to
happiness. It is only "after the fact" that we are able to determine which
actions best led to happiness. But, what is the use of a maxim of behavior or
standard which cannot determined before-hand what acts will better lead to a
particular goal than another (perhaps contradictory) set of standards and acts?
What type of standard of action cannot determine the best action before an
action occurs? Such a "standard" hardly deserves this name if it is only able
to determine the value of an act after the fact.
Happiness is therefore not a valid criteria or standard of behavior.
Perhaps to avoid this dilemma we should use as a standard the "greatest
happiness for all" principle, but what is the evidence of this? Why should
someone be forced to make a decisions upon such a principle of behavior,
especially when following this principle may often lead to his unhappiness?
In some way the principle of "greatest good" goes outside the boundaries of
personal happiness and self-love. It seems to call into play some notion of
equity which can hardly compensate for the loss of individual happiness and
freedom.
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KANT ON "SELF LOVE" AND INSTRUMENTALISM
This brings us to another of Kant's arguments against this empirical
standard. Rousseau and others had argued that the primary moral sentiment
was "self-love." He argued that by nature everyone had this self-love, and
that if everyone followed this moral sentiment everyone would be moral. In
the Second Discourse he used this notion to argue that natural man was both
moral and good, and it was only with the establishment of society and the
burial of self-love by selfishness that man grew evil. The best form of social
order, according to this view, would be the one which replaced this self-love
at the highest pinnacle of morality, and assured that it will be adopted as the
standard of action by all. This runs counter to the whole of Kant's thinking,
not only about society, but morality itself.
Kant will show that even were it true that everyone partook of this
self-love, yet this would not qualify it as a moral standard, for it would be
descriptive rather than prescriptive. Even if everyone agreed that self-love
served as the goal and everyone agreed on the means of attaining this goal
this principle of self-love could not serve in a law-like fashion for
determining the will "for the unanimity itself would be merely contingent.
The determining ground would still be only subjectively valid and empirical,
and it would not have necessity .... "175 Kant was here, according to Beck,
"warning against allowing any empirical principle to be called a law .... "176
Kant's response to Rousseau, therefore, is that self-love, though it may be

175Kant, Practical Reason p. 25
176Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1960) p. 83
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beneficial and unanimous, cannot serve as a standard of morality since it lack
the element of necessity: "the maxim of self-love merely advises; the law of
morality commands. "177 Kant believed this demonstrated that there must be
another ground for behavior, one which is both universal and necessary. It
must, therefore, be a priori, and for Kant this meant it would be purely
rational without any mixture of the empirical.
Moral law must be sought in the pure realm of reason, but, once more,
not in the Rousseauian sense of reason. Reason in the philosophy of
Rousseau is "instrumentalist." That is, he believed the purpose and end of
reason was to insure the well-being of man. Reason was not an end in itself.
Well used it would construct favorable social institutions which would
produce a state of equality and happiness comparable to a state of nature.
Reason was, for Rousseau, the means of attaining in society what was lost
with the emergence of society. Reason is a product of society, but that does
not disqualify it from being social man's best hope in the view of Rousseau.
Rousseau took pains to show in the two Discourses that it had not been used
that way and has been the bane of man, causing envy, lust, and inequality.
But if used rightly it could prove man's salvation and if placed in the hands
of some worthy legislator, like Rousseau, man could be steered by reason into
his own, best hope. Rousseau is ever the political philosopher and his
treatment of reason reflected his objectives.
Kant, on the other hand, was always the metaphysician, even when
seemingly despising the profession. Reason was, for Kant, its own end. He
shared with Rousseau the belief that reason was the last, best hope for

177Kant, Practical Reason p. 37
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mankind, but happiness was not the final goal of reason. Happiness may be
produced along the way, it may be a product of reason attaining its ends, but
this does not mean that reason's aim is the attaining of happiness. This view
is simply too empirical for Kant. It assumes, once more, that we can know
before-hand what will actually make us happy--a position Kant rejected on
grounds already discussed. Kant will go so far as to suggest that the human
species may progress along the road to the rational ends, but this does not
mean that the condition of the individual person will significantly improve
or grow "happier." In fact, Kant rejects 'eudaemonic' philosophy because,
when looking at the individual with his mixture of equal parts good and evil,
one cannot conclude that the species is progressing or indeed could ever
progress.178 Yet, progress is undeniable for the species (this was the
Enlightenment period after all, and few individuals--with the noted
exception of Rousseau--were willing to even entertain the notion that the
Enlightenment was a reversal rather than progress). Reason progresses on its
own. The species as a whole grows better even if individuals are no happier
or noticeably better.
Kant's arguments against "instrumentalism" did not rest solely on his
notion of progress. He had another and, for the present purposes, more
significant argument against the idea that reason's goal is to attain happiness.
This argument is central to his ethical theory and may be found in many
shapes throughout the whole of his works. A good example is in his work
"The End of All Things" where Kant discussed Christianity. The underlying

178Immanuel Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human
Race Constantly Progressing" in On History, ed. by Lewis White Beck. (New
York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1963) p. 140
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question to this essay is "should we be Christians?" to which he answered
with a guarded "yes." The crux of the discussion is over what value there is
in Christianity? Is its value the promise of heaven at the end of a troubled
life? Shall we be Christians for the sake of going to heaven? "No," said Kant,
for this would be to think of Christianity's value in terms of a "bribe" offered
by God to man for "good conduct"?179 If that is the value of Christianity then
it is worthless. One must not be required to act in a certain manner for the
hope of rewards, for "only a desire for such actions which arise from
disinterested motives can inspire human respect...therefore, we must not
think that the promised rewards are intended to be taken for the incentives of
the actions."180 It will later be clearer how this section ideally reflects the
central treatise of Kantian ethics, but for now I wish to point out that Kant is
thoroughly consistent on this position. Actions, and that means "moral
actions," must be done freely and with disinterest. They cannot be done for
the hope of a reward, for then they are neither free nor disinterested.
Happiness may be produced along the way, just as "heaven" may be attained
as a result of a "Christian" life, but these are not essential, but accidental,
elements. Therefore, while there is no evidence that individuals are getting
better or happier this is not a problem if reason is unconcerned with
individual happiness or benefit.
Once more, Kant's approach is metaphysical while Rousseau's was
political. They disagreed widely on the purpose and nature of reason, and

179Immanuel Kant, "The End of All Things" in On History, ed. by
Lewis White Beck. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1963) p. 83
180Kant, "End of All Things" p. 83

81
this is reflected in every aspect of their work. The uniqueness of Kant's
position is that "morality is to be entirely separated from the motivation of
happiness or pleasure. "181 Reason must have its own end which will
distinguish it from empirical ends. Only then can we claim that reason meets
the necessary criteria as a standard of behavior. If reason is bound to
producing happiness then we will have the same dilemma with reason that
we had with "happiness" for we will be unable to determine which of the
contradictory means of attaining this end will best lead us to the greatest
happiness. This was, according to Taylor, a revolution in morals.182
THE INTERNAL LAW: THE "OUGHT" AND DUTY
At issue in the whole of the preceding discussion is the notion of
"prescriptive principles." What prescriptive weight does an empirical
generalization bear? Kant argued that it had none. It can note the way things
have previously been done--much as Hume will leave one with the option of
saying only that the sun has risen in the past--but it cannot prescribe the way
things "ought" to be done. It carries with it no necessity, and thus bears the
title 'law' gingerly and without conviction. Beck uses the example of a falling
object and Galileo's law.183 Galileo's law accurately described the state of
affairs which have so far occurred, but it does not prescribe the course of any
particular object. Rather, any exception to the rule by an object results in the
re-classification of the object. If moral laws are empirical then a subject may

181 Taylor Hegel p. 4
182Taylor Hegel p. 4
183Beck, Commentary on Kant's Critigue p. 83
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decide to simply abstain from the general consensus. What charge can be
brought against such a decision? Galileo's law at least expressed a natural,
physical, necessity, but what necessity can there possible be to such a moral
law--even if so far everyone agreed with it? It is no more than a contingent
principle which may still be altered. Yet, if a law has no necessity, how can we
say it is prescriptive and not simply descriptive? We cannot. Once more we
see the long shadow of Hume. In order for a law to be moral it must exhibit
necessity and have a prescriptive characteristic.
We may now sum-up Kant's position to this point. In the Critique of
Pure Reason Kant had shown that that which belongs to the empirical world,
the world of the senses, must also be determined by the laws of nature. Thus,
it follows that a decision based on an empirical precept is not free but subject
to the laws of causality. This means we cannot seek the foundation of
morality in empirical goals, but must turn instead to reason.
Speculative reason, as Kant demonstrated in the first Critique had
proven unfruitful in the question of freedom. The "employment" of
speculative reason on the issue of freedom is "notwithstanding the very
heavy labor which [it] impose[s] upon our reason, entirely useless."184
Transcendental philosophy, on the other hand is only slightly more fruitful.
But for all its efforts it goes no further than establishing the uncontradictory
possibility of freedom. Finally, there can also be no empirical basis for
establishing moral actions. All must now give way to practical reason.
Practical reason is variously defined by Kant, but in general it "deals
with the grounds determining the will." This definition requires further

184Kant, Pure Reason B:827 p. 661
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refinement by defining "will," since in Kant even the most common word
often takes on an uncommon meaning. Kant defined 'will' as "a faculty
either of bringing forth objects corresponding to conceptions or of
determining itself.... "185 In other places Kant equated will and practical
reason,186 but to prevent confusion I would like to maintain their distinction
for the moment.
What determines the will? How can the will produce actions in such a
way that it "brings forth" results which are in line with a concept or plan of
reason? As Kant had previously noted a causality which is apart from the
empirical, sensuous world of nature would be "a causality of freedom." That
which is able to spontaneously set off a causal chain in and of itself would be
free in the sense that it is not constrained by nature. Yet why should we
assume there is in us a will which transcends the natural order? What
evidence is there of such a will, and why should we believe that this will is a
product of reason and not empirical inclinations?
Kant believed that if we examine morality we can prove some form of
rational freedom, or at least the necessity of its existence. It does not follow
that we will completely understand the nature of freedom, but we may at
least be able to conclude the existence of a causality separate from the natural
order, and hence a realm free from nature. The proper place to begin this
inquiry is with the question "why do we do what we do?" What forces drive

185Kant, Practical Reason p. 15
186Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, in
Ethical Philosophy. Translated by James W. Ellington. (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company. 1983) p. 23
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us, especially when we are faced with moral actions? Is there a principle, or
set of principles, behind these actions, and if so from where do they arise?
As was noted before we describe, by use of natural law and experience,
what actually happens; it is the moral law which tells us what "ought" to
happen.187 It is this notion of ought which will serve as the key to Kant's
concept of freedom.
What did Kant mean by "ought," that is, what is its significance.
Another example may make this clearer. Let us suppose some individual has
engaged in a series of bank robberies. We can descriptively relate this
individual's activities, we can bring to bear the background conditions which
led up to the robberies, we can describe what this individual hoped to gain
from these robberies, but, according to Kant, we are completely without
ground in determining guilt--or the wrongness of these actions--by empirical
laws.
Empirical laws may well describe the action, may well explain the
wants, and desires which determined this action; but it cannot explain why
the action was wrong. To suggest that an action should or should not occur
presupposes a causality which is not empirical; it presupposes an "ought." To
say that something ought to be done, or to say we ought to do such and such
reveals an obligation which steps outside the natural world. The "ought"
suggest that certain actions should or should not be done without regard for
individual desires, conditions, or situations. Thus, this obligation must arise,
not from experience but from pure reason for:

187Kant, Grounding for Metaphysics p. 20
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reason commands how one ought to act, even though no
instance of such action might be found; moreover, reason
pays no attention to the advantage which can accrue to us
from such action, which admittedly only experience could
teach ....
Thus we find that "reason of itself and independently of all experience
commands what ought to happen."188 These rational laws--moral
imperatives--if truly pure are categorical: they are a priori, universal and
necessary, not just for humans but for all rational beings.189 They also have a
practical relevance, for they serve to determine actions; they determine the
will.
MAN AS RATIONAL BEING
Kant, having established the possibility of a non-empirical causality
now focused his attention on man as a rational being. Man know nature
through his senses, and thus knows or can know empirical laws. But, he
seems to know himself not only through his senses but also by "... acts and
inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the
senses."190 Man is not only phenomenal but in "respect of certain faculties
the action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility (he is) a
purely intelligible object."191 Precisely what are these "certain faculties"?
They are reason and understanding.192 Reason, Kant stated, gives us

188Kant, Grounding for Metaphysics p. 20
189Kant, Grounding for Metaphysics p. 20-23
190Kant, Pure Reason B:574 p. 472
191Kant, Pure Reason B:575 p. 472
192Kant, Pure Reason B:575 p. 472
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"imperatives" which are the rules of the mind. They imply the ought,
"which is found nowhere else in the whole of nature."193 When we view
nature we ask of it only what has happened, we do not ask of it what "ought"
to happen for the notion of ought is inapplicable to nature.194 But reason,
Kant argued is not limited to the purely descriptive "what happened."
Instead, reason:
frames for itself with perfect spontaneity an order of its own ...
to which it adapts the empirical conditions, and according to
which it declares actions to be necessary, even although they
have never taken place, and perhaps never will take place.195
Reason operates on necessary laws which are not determined by the laws of
nature, nor even on the possibility of realizing these actions in the empirical
world. That is, empirical criteria cannot be applied to the laws of reason to
determine their validity. Thus, these laws are not the result of experience nor
are they bound by experience. It seems, Kant continued, that "reason also
presupposes that it can have causality .... " in the empirical world, i.e., a
phenomenological effect.196
This was a presupposition of the utmost importance. Kant was
proposing that reason is subject to laws other than the those of the natural
order, and that reason may in fact impose itself upon the natural order as a
causal agent. In a sense this is analogous to Rousseau's self-imposed laws.

193Kant, Pure Reason B:575 p. 472
194Kant, Pure Reason B:575 p. 472
195Kant, Pure Reason B:576 p. 473
196Kant, Pure Reason B:576 p. 473
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According to Kant, these laws arise wholly from within and are not
something imposed upon man or learned in the course of his life

Thus, the

noumena world and the phenomenal world would meet in the "will" of
man (or any rational being). Pure reason would have practical content since
it would determine the behavior of a phenomenal being apart from the
lawful order of the natural realm. The "ought," therefore, would be the law
of reason in practice, the basis of all moral imperatives--it would be the only
standard possible for a true morality since it is prescriptive and not
descriptive like empirical and physical laws. If such a external causality could
be shown to exist the conclusion would inevitable be that in an important
sense pure reason would be free:
for since reason is not itself an appearance, and is not subject to
any condition of sensibility (including time) ... the dynamical law
of nature, which determines succession in time in accordance
with rules, is not applicable to it.197
In other words, since time is a criteria of the phenomenal realm, and if reason
can be shown to exist apart from this realm, then reason is not subject to time.
It is timeless in the truest sense of the world--not in that it lasts "forever" (for

even this concept is one that assumes the existence of time), but rather it does
not exist in the same realm as does time. It is dangerous to step onto the
slippery slope of idealism and questions of "reality," but in a way time is not
"real." It is simply the "form" of certain experiences. According to Kant, if
reason exists apart from time, and if cause and effect are ultimately dependent
for their existence upon time then we must conclude that reason also is freed

197Kant, Pure Reason B:581 p. 476
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from the binding affect of causality. We cannot speak of reason being
"caused" by anything since this would be to subject reason to a form of
experience that reason precedes, or at least transcends.
REASON AS GROUND TO FREEDOM
This was Kant's solution to the problem of freedom. Reason itself
imposes upon our acts. It is a reason detached from the natural world, and
while it is not something which we can succinctly define or understand in its
essence we witness its existence and influence every time we make a
statement about how things "ought" to have been or what we ought" to
/1

/1

have done. The sense of ought" is the manifestation of our pure reason
dicta ting to us the correct course of action.
This is not to say that humans ever act on absolutely pure reason. Kant
placed humans midway on the scale between a pure or "holy" will and
"animal choice"--a choice "determined solely by inclination."198 As Kant
noted "human choice .. .is such as to be affected but not determined by
impulses. Accordingly, in itself.. .it is not pure .... "199 Yet, pure reason lifts
human choice out of animal impulse. It is for this cause that the categorical
imperative is presented to the human will as an "ought," for a perfectly good
being would have no need for a law. Rather, a "holy" will would conceive of
the good and act on the good automatically in the same moment. There
would be no struggle with conflicting impulses. It is, however, the mixed
constitution of the human will which makes the categorical imperative not

198Kant, Metaphysics of Morals p. 12
199Kant, Metaphysics of Morals p. 12
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automatic but rather a means "... for expressing the relation of objective laws
of willing in general to the subjective imperfection of the will ... "200 The
categorical imperative acts as a standard upon which we measure our actions
and choice. It is the fact that we operate not simply by animal inclination
which demonstrated the practical significance of pure reason.
The very fact that our actions are not solely determined by animal
impulse means that our actions are not completely determined by natural
causality. The fact that pure reason has practical applicability, that it at least
co-determines the will, means that human actions are at least partially free.
In practical philosophy freedom proves it existence in that it determines
choice "independently of all empirical conditions."201

Freedom is

demonstrated by the fact that there exists in rational creatures another form of
causality. A causality which is not empirical. A causality which arises
separately form the natural order. Thus, it is the moral law which is able to
do what speculative philosophy could not do--give "objective reality" to
freedom, for the fact that we can will to act, and to some extent even act, in a
manner contrary to our animal, physical, inclination is for Kant the evidence
of another form of law determining our will.202 A law which is pure and not
subject to the laws of causality.

200Kant, Grounding for Metaphysics p. 24
201 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals p. 20-21
202Kant, Practical Reason p. 49
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In our phenomenological existence we are determined by the laws of
natural necessity, but in pure reason, the noumena realm, we are not subject
to these laws. Rather we are, in pure reason, subject to a separate law which
does not arise from experience nor is determined by experience. As sensuous
beings we are determined, but as pure intellectual beings we are free.
Here then, is Kant's formation of a "rule by law" which established the
freedom of the individual as Rousseau had tried to do before him. The two
notions are superficially similar though both claim the law of reason as
justification for their belief in freedom. Rousseau complicated this definition
with his instrumentalist approach to reason and his reliance upon the
"general will." Kant may validly wonder what mechanism is in place which
assured Rousseau of the rationality of the general will. Rousseau may claim
that "whatever the 'general will' wills" is correct and rational by definition
because there is no other criteria of rationality or correctness, but this seems to
trivialize the issue, and gives the lie to what Rousseau seemed to be doing
himself when he assumed the mantle of the "legislator." In other words,
Rousseau is himself the best evidence against the position he seemed to be
presenting. Rousseau may seek to justify himself from this charge by arguing
that he is doing no more than what the "general will" would do if it had the
chance to do so, but this in itself seems to amount to a realization of a
"correct" and "incorrect" perspective which has little to do with the context.
Rousseau is admitting to an a priori criteria, though he himself is unaware
that he does so. He is implicitly acknowledging a moral or rational principle
which precedes the actual establishment of a just state.
Once more we return to Kant's notion of the determining rational
principle. This principle served much the same function as did Rousseau's
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"general will," for as the general will was to mold and shape, not only actions,
but even the wishes of the individual, so Kant's rational principle determines
the will, and the subsequent actions of the individual. Kant, however, did
not believe, as did Rousseau, that this moral will can be taught. In fact, Kant
clearly rejected this Rousseauian solution in his work The Metaphysics of
Morals. For Kant there were two realms of laws, just as there are two realms
of being. The division, for Kant, is between the political realm of law and the
moral. In each realm we discover a rule of law, but the "incentives" in each
differ. Roughly put the external realm, the political, uses as incentives for
actions everything except "duty." In this realm there is brought to bear all
manner of incentives ranging from threat of force (Rousseau's "force them to
be free") to hope of reward. We can be forced, for example, to drive at a
certain speed for fear of a ticket. We can be forced to respect the domain of
our neighbor by not carrying off the shovel he left in his yard overnight, or
sleeping with his wife when he is away from home, by the fear of the bodily
harm he would inflict upon us if he caught us. On the other hand, we may
act in certain ways, not from fear but for hope of some certificate or public
expression of recognition. Rousseau thought the Republic should employ
this type of incentive constantly. It will be found in Poland to be the preferred
means of creating the civic spirit he feels necessary. It is also the means
frequently used in Socialist economic systems such as the late East Germany
and in U.S. factories like Motorola. In both cases spotless attendance for some
considerable period is rewarded, not with financial compensation, but with a
pin which may be worn on the lapel. In both cases it will usually bear the
logo "excellent service award." Naturally, monetary compensation for
noteworthy behavior is also a frequent incentive. None of these methods are
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moral, and one means of enforcing certain behavior is just as amoral as
another. In the end, we are coerced to act in a particular manner.
But, there is another form of incentive which is moral. It stems from
within the individual himself. I may be forced to act in a particular manner
from an outside force, but there also exists within me a sense of duty and an
"oughtness" which is not dependent upon any outside influence. Kant writes
that "that lawgiver which makes an action a duty and also makes this duty
the incentive is 'ethical."'203 The "lawgiver" in this particular case does not
exist outside a person, and in fact could not do so. It is, in fact, the practical
reason (or pure reason in its practical manifestation). It is the will for "the
capacity for desire whose inner determining ground .. .lies within the subject's
reason is called the will."204 The will is simply the subjects reason being
practical.
Pure reason, in its practical manifestation, is not subject to external
coercion--nor internal coercion like the pursuit of happiness for that matter.
It is a "form of a principle" which means it is both necessary and universal.

Put in another way, it is not a particular maxim like "do unto others ... ," but
the form of all particular maxims. It lies beneath them all as their ground
and justification. It is therefore categorical. It is perhaps best exemplified by
the statement "act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law."205 This is necessarily
abstract for the purpose of being universal. It does not refer to any particular
203Kant, Metaphysics of Morals p. 219-19 (emphasis in the original)
204Kant, Metaphysics of Morals p. 213
205Kant, Grounding for Metaphysics p. 30
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case or goal, but instead demands that before undertaking any action we
consider whether this act would be justifiable on a universal standard. In
other words, the real standard of behavior is that all our action may be
justifiable by the mere form of universality in pure reason.
Universality is not a principle which can be touched or troubled by
force, hope of reward, or anything else. It is not personal and does not vary
from case to case. It cannot be legislated from without and thus the "general
will" cannot shape it. This is so because the general will can only make laws
dealing with individual problems or for specific goals. The principle of pure
reason, however, is unconcerned with either. At best it may lie at the root of
the laws designed by the general will, but it is not legislated by this means. It
remains the form of a principle in crystalline purity in any rational creature.
The distance between Kant and Rousseau is never greater than at this point.
It is the distinctive element of Kant's moral philosophy which separates him

from all previous moral theorists.
Thus, in the end, we cannot define freedom in its being, and are unable
to use reason itself to examine the nature of freedom or make statements
about how and why it occurs. But we are able to offer as a tentative
explanation of freedom that it is, in its practical extent, "rule by law." Once
more this begs comparison with Rousseau. The two men vary widely on the
nature of this "law," but both accept the necessity of law as a precondition for
freedom (in a non-natural setting). But, even though there is a great deal of
difference in the meaning of this "law" we must also recognize that Rousseau
at least foreshadowed Kant's conclusion. Rousseau is not as clear on this
point, and we are prevented from concluding that Kant "discovered" this
notion in his reading of Rousseau, but he does suggest that the laws of the
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state, to be equitable, must arise from the reason of man. It is clear that for
Rousseau they cannot arise from any external source--like God or Nature--but
must come from within the heart and mind of man. Still, in Rousseau, it is
not completely clear that these laws can be said to arise in the minds of all
men rather than that they are instilled in the hearts and minds of men
through the "legislator." Ultimately, the Rousseauian perspective is that
whatever was held by the general will was lawful and moral and that it was
the duty of the individual to internalize the laws, mores and customs of the
state. This is hardly a description of the transcendent law of reason which
Kant would accept since and is far too contextual for his liking. He would
accept as a "law" only what was necessary and universal. Thus, Kant's
criticism of an empirical basis for action would here apply. Only those
principles which could determine action before an empirical context can
justifiable be described as a "law."
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, I realize that I would have saved myself much of
the early toil of trying to grasp the concept of freedom in the works of
Rousseau and Kant if I had not been waylaid by terminology. I would never
again attempt to write a similar work on "Freedom" in Kant and Rousseau,
for the term 'freedom' is over-worked and in some fashion inapplicable to
their work. I would approach Rousseau, in the future, in terms of political
equality and Kant in terms of rational autonomy.
Rousseau is simply too concerned with social harmony to treat as one
interested in freedom. His emphasis on the "General will," on community,
and on concession all tell against freedom which must, at root, allow some
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ground to individual nonconformity. But, nonconformity is the last thing
Rousseau is willing to concede to in his social order. His fear of social
divisiveness is just too strong to allow for a multiplicity of opinions.
Without at least the potential for this multiplicity in society how can we
speak of "freedom"? We can see that absolute freedom is an unattainable
goal. We can admit that social, economic, national and other factors all
contribute to limiting the field of possible choices for any one individual at
any given period of time. We can see that part of the goal of education is to
create some sense of unity, community, cooperation and a certain "virtue" in
impressionable youths. Indeed, when we train children in correct behavior
we are in fact not far from Rousseau's idea of building a proper society. But
the difference is that we usually end such extreme paternalism in
adolescence, while Rousseau would maintain it through all the years of his
republicans. Indeed, Rousseau's citizens often seem little more than large,
overgrown children (with their parades, festivities and the like) in the
shadow of the protective, if censorious and stern, father. It would be
interested to examine Rousseau's statements about his own father and early
home life as a means of better understanding the genesis of his political
ideals.
There is in Rousseau a sense of "freedom," I do not argue against that.
But it is the freedom from social inequality and all its negative results.
Freedom "from" something in this negative sense does not guarantee a
positive sense of freedom for something. That is, freedom from physical
abuse does not imply that I am free. Such a sense of freedom may be
guarantied to those interned in a prison. They will not be abused, but they are
not able to simply leave either. Rousseau seems to reduce everyone to the
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state in which they are equally imprisoned and then to declare this state
"free" because no one is enjoying benefits not enjoyed by others. At some
point it seems to me that there must be a willingness to accept the nonconformist to a degree. At times in our history nonconformists have been
deemed pariahs, the "lunatic fringe" or whatever: they may have been cast
down the social ladder, expelled from good society etc., but never could we
speak in Rousseauian terms of forcing them "to be free" by forcing them to
conform. Quite to the contrary, in those periods where we have had sedition
laws, "un-American trials" and the like, we have tended to view these times
as examples of "trampling freedom underfoot." Yet, Rousseau's Republic
would make such abuses seem tame. "Freedom" in his system must make
way for social equality and harmony by rooting out all that does not share the
mind of the "general will."
Meanwhile, there is the confusion involved in Kant's notion of
freedom. Kant had a better claim than Rousseau for the use of the term
'freedom'. But even in Kant the term is used in a very unintuitive sense.
Yet, at the root of Kant there is a strong belief in the moral freedom of the
individual. This is one of Kant's richest contributions to the discussion of
morals. In the Kantian system every individual is a free moral agent. There
is no disparity of "gifts of grace." The Pope is no more of a free moral agent
than is the lowliest parishioner, the king no more than his lowest subject,
and the theologian and metaphysician no more of an authority on morality
than the illiterate fisherman who sets out from port early each morning. In
fact, in Kant, God himself is no more a moral authority than that same
fisherman. One may be able to cast the conflict of moral choices in greater
elegance and exactitude, but in the end the "ought" of the one is as true and
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good as the "ought" of the other. There is a recognition of individual moral
choice and "freedom" here which cannot be found in the works of Rousseau.
Kant's "Doctrine of Right" in his Metaphysics of Morals squarely addresses
Rousseau's "general will" and internalization of the laws of this will. Kant
completely discounts this means of action as a basis for morality or freedom,
and in this I believe he is exactly correct. Nothing I am forced to do, through
fear or hope of reward, can count as a moral choice anymore than those acts
which I do unintentionally and which work for good in spite of my intention.
In the latter case they are accidental and in the former coercion. By definition
then, morality and moral freedom is always, and intimately, personal and
individual.
We have not, on the basis of the above account, uncovered Kant "the
libertine." Such a misinterpretation collides immediately with those
elements in Kant which, while appearing to point to an easy-going relativity
of morals, actually point in the very opposite direction. Kant's vision of the
ideal society differs very little, on the exterior, from Rousseau's. In a society
which truly held to Kant' view there would be the harmony so longed for by
Rousseau. In Kant's view there is only one real form of a moral law which
we all share. It can be expressed as the "categorical imperative," but this is
nothing but the formulation of a principle unutterable. What it is in actuality
we cannot say for it is hidden in the noumenal world, but its practical
manifestations are observed. But the fact that there is a universal principle
that we all share must give pause to those who would use the term 'freedom'
in the intuitive sense. I am not arguing for a unrestricted freedom, but rather
questioning a notion of freedom based upon a determining causality. True, it
is not a physical causality, but it is determining none the less. Kant's
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argument is that we are, by virtue of this moral law, free from the laws of
science and nature. But the nature of our freedom is that, unlike animals and
falling rocks, we are subject to one other law that they are not. We are free to
obey this other law while they simply react in a "natural," hence amoral,
manner. But, in the end it seems we have simply traded a set of laws for a
law of reason. We are subject to a noumenal law which does not exist for
phenomenal beings. We are free, by virtue of this law of reason, to obey it.
We should not get the mistaken idea that our freedom extends to being able
to disobey this rational, moral law. Anytime we do not exercise our freedom
to obey the moral law we are not "choosing," but being led by inclination-hence natural causality. We obey the law of reason or are enslaved to
phenomenal causality. We thus have a one-sided choice. Our choice is
limited to obedience. Anything else is simply an abdication of our freedom.
Thus, it is a conditional freedom we enjoy. It, once more, can be seen as
freedom "from" something. This time it is freedom from natural causality or
scientific determinism.
This criticism is far less damaging to Kant's case than was the objection
to Rousseau. There is a real sense in which Kant can claim to validly use the
term 'freedom' which we would be hard-put to find in Rousseau. Yet, it
seems like "rational autonomy" would be a better choice of words in Kant
than "freedom." I make this distinction because such a one-sided choice--the
choice to obey--as that which we find in Kant steps somewhat short of what
we usually mean by freedom. "Freedom" without at least the opportunity for
disobedience is a strangely construed definition. But, once more, this is far
less of a dilemma than Rousseau's concept of freedom. In Kant it is a matter
of perspective. I can choose to set aside my inclinations, goals, hopes, wishes,
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desires, experiences etc., and chose to step out of the phenomenal world of my
experience into the pure light of reason to make a moral choice. In this sense
I am free from the constrictions which bind every unrational being around
me. I have "transcended" nature in the best sense of the word. But, seen
from a slightly different perspective this seems less of a true accomplishment
for I have exchanged one determining factor for another. This may guarantee
a type of freedom which is significantly less than the one we would wish to
believe we possess. But then, in the end, perhaps this is the best for which we
could ever really hope.
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